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Abstract 
 
The goal of this dissertation is to investigate the impact of the American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants’ (AICPA) recently adopted cybersecurity risk management 
examination on investor perceptions and decisions.  The dissertation implements a two-essay 
approach. 
Essay 1 examines the effect of voluntary disclosures of joint or separate provisioning of 
cybersecurity risk management examinations on investor perceptions and decisions, and whether 
these effects differ when a subsequent cybersecurity incident occurs.  Conducting a 2 x 2 
between-participants experiment, I find that the negative signal of a subsequent cybersecurity 
incident reverses investors’ positive perceptions of auditor competence and increases investors’ 
sensitivity to potential independence impairments when the cybersecurity risk management 
examination is jointly provisioned, leading to lower perceptions of audit quality.  I also find that 
investors are less willing to invest when the cybersecurity risk management examination is 
jointly compared to separately provisioned.  My results provide important insights to regulators 
and standard setters who have raised concerns regarding the importance of addressing 
cybersecurity risk in the integrated internal control over financial reporting and financial 
statements audits and the potential for independence impairments from increased auditor 
performed non-audit services such as cybersecurity.  My study also contributes to the non-audit 
services literature not only by examining a unique and emerging non-audit service not previously 
examined, but also by showing that non-audit services are perceived differently depending on 
whether a negative signal of non-audit service quality is present. 
vi 
 
Essay 2 examines the effect of the type of cybersecurity assurance service on investor 
perceptions and decisions and whether these effects differ when a prior cybersecurity incident is 
reported.  Conducting a 2 x 2 between-participants experiment, I find that investors are more 
willing to invest and have higher perceptions of management credibility when voluntary 
disclosures include a cybersecurity risk management examination compared to a less 
comprehensive cybersecurity assurance service.  These findings are important because public 
company boards are increasingly looking to audit firms to provide cybersecurity assurance 
services.  I also find that investors perceive cybersecurity risk management examinations to 
provide higher assurance quality regarding an organization’s ability not only to prevent future 
cybersecurity incidents, but also to recover from future cybersecurity incidents that are not 
prevented - a key risk management issue raised by regulators.  My study also contributes to the 
voluntary assurance disclosure literature by examining investor reactions to management 
disclosures of alternative types of voluntary external cybersecurity assurance services, beyond a 
comparison of the absence or presence of external assurance reports provided by CPAs 
previously examined in other non-financial voluntary assurance settings.  I also find that 
management’s choice to acquire a more comprehensive cybersecurity assurance service has a 
positive effect on investors’ perceptions of management credibility, which in turn has a positive 
effect on investors’ willingness to invest.   
This dissertation contributes to the growing literature related to cybersecurity.  Most of 
this work has been archival in nature and as such, has not been able to examine the effects of the 
AICPA’s recently adopted cybersecurity risk management examination reporting.  Using an 
experimental method, I am able to examine important implications of voluntary cybersecurity 
risk management examination reporting and present opportunities for future research.
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Chapter 1. Dissertation Overview 
 
1.1 Overall Motivation 
 
With the goal of providing more complete and useful information to investors, the 
Securities and Exchange Committee (SEC) recently issued guidance for public company 
cybersecurity risk and incident disclosures including information about cybersecurity risk 
management programs and preventative actions taken to reduce cybersecurity risks (SEC 2018a).  
In response to increased cybersecurity risk and the growing demand for information about how 
organizations are managing cybersecurity risk, the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants (AICPA) recently released a new cybersecurity risk management examination 
service designed to provide external assurance related to the effectiveness of an organization’s 
cybersecurity risk management program (AICPA 2017a).  A cybersecurity risk management 
program is “a set of policies, processes, and controls designed to protect information and systems 
from security events that could compromise the achievement of the entity’s cybersecurity 
objectives and to detect, respond to, mitigate, and recover from, on a timely basis, security events 
that are not prevented” (AICPA 2017b, 207).   
The AICPA’s new cybersecurity risk management examination service provides a 
general-use report intended to benefit a broad range of potential users including investors 
(AICPA 2017a); however, it is unclear how nonprofessional investor perceptions and decisions 
will be impacted by organizations’ voluntary cybersecurity risk management examination 
disclosures.  In addition, cybersecurity incidents are often highly publicized in the news, are 
increasing, and are required to be disclosed if material (SEC 2011, 2017a).  It is possible that an 
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organization’s disclosure of a significant cybersecurity incident could impact investor reactions 
to that organization’s voluntary cybersecurity risk management examination disclosure.  As 
such, the overall goal of this dissertation is to investigate the impact of voluntary cybersecurity 
risk management examination disclosures on investor perceptions and decisions.  
 
1.2 Overview of the Two Essays 
 
Figure 1.1 provides an overview of the dissertation and the relationships among the two 
essays.  Essay 1 and Essay 2 read as standalone essays and can be read in any order.  The 
dissertation examines the effects of three independent constructs: provisioning type, 
cybersecurity incident, and type of cybersecurity assurance service.  In Essay 1, provisioning 
type is operationalized as joint provisioning or separate provisioning because cybersecurity risk 
management examinations are classified as permitted non-audit services and organizations can 
obtain cybersecurity risk management examination services from their existing financial 
statement auditors, i.e., joint provisioning, or from a separate provider (U.S. Congress 2002; SEC 
2003).  Cybersecurity incident is operationalized in Essay 1 as the absence or presence of a 
cybersecurity incident subsequent to a voluntary cybersecurity risk management examination 
disclosure and in Essay 2 as the absence or presence of a cybersecurity incident prior to a 
voluntary cybersecurity risk management examination disclosure.  In Essay 2, type of 
cybersecurity assurance service is operationalized as a more or less comprehensive assurance 
service because cybersecurity assurance services can differ in terms of the comprehensiveness of 
the subject matter (AICPA 2017b).   
Essay 1 draws on source credibility theory (Birnbaum and Stegner 1979) and DeAngelo’s 
(1981) theoretical audit quality model to develop hypotheses regarding the impact of 
provisioning type and cybersecurity incident on investor perceptions and decisions.  Essay 2 
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draws on dual processing theories (Chaiken 1980; Petty and Cacioppo 1986; Chaiken and 
Maheswaran 1994; Kahneman 2003) and Mercer’s (2004) management disclosure framework to 
develop hypotheses regarding the impact of type of cybersecurity assurance service and 
cybersecurity incident on investor perceptions and decisions.  
The remainder of the dissertation is organized as follows.  Chapter 2 presents Essay 1 as 
a standalone essay and Chapter 3 presents Essay 2 as a standalone essay.  Chapter 4 concludes 
the dissertation. 
 
1.3 Figure of Dissertation Overview 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1: Dissertation Overview 
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Chapter 2. Essay 1: The Impact of Cybersecurity Risk Management Examinations and 
Cybersecurity Incidents on Investor Perceptions and Decisions 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Cybersecurity risk is increasingly viewed as one of the most significant challenges facing 
companies in the U.S. (KPMG 2018; PwC 2019).  Cybercrime can result in reputational damage, 
loss of intellectual property, disruption of business operations, government fines, and litigation 
expenses (AICPA 2017a; CAQ 2016a).  In response to these risks and the growing demand for 
information about organizations’ cybersecurity risk management programs,1 the American 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) has released a new examination-level 
attestation service designed to provide assurance related to the effectiveness of organizations’ 
cybersecurity controls (AICPA 2017a).  The cybersecurity risk management examination is a 
voluntary, general-use report that is intended to benefit a broad range of potential users including 
investors, directors, analysts, and regulators (AICPA 2017a; CAQ 2016a).2     
Recent high-profile cybersecurity breaches at public companies (e.g., Target, Home 
Depot, Sony) have heightened the general public’s and investors’ sensitivity to such incidents. 
As public companies increasingly seek to provide voluntary cybersecurity risk management 
                                                 
1 A cybersecurity risk management program is a “…set of policies, processes, and controls designed to protect 
information and systems from security events that could compromise the achievement of the entity’s cybersecurity 
objectives and to detect, respond to, mitigate, and recover from, on a timely basis, security events that are not 
prevented” (AICPA 2017b, 207). 
2 System and Organization Controls (SOC) for Cybersecurity examinations include three components: (1) 
management’s description of the cybersecurity risk management program, (2) management’s assertion that the 
description is presented in accordance with the AICPA’s description criteria and the controls within the program 
were effective based on the control criteria, AICPA’s Trust Services or alternatives, and (3) the CPA’s opinion on 
management’s description and the effectiveness of the controls within the program (AICPA 2017a).  
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examination disclosures, it is unclear how nonprofessional (retail) investors will perceive such 
disclosures.  Accordingly, the AICPA has called for research that explores how users respond to 
cybersecurity risk management examination reporting (AAA 2017a, 2017b).  Moreover, the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is particularly concerned about cybersecurity 
threats facing nonprofessional (retail) investors and the need for more robust cybersecurity 
disclosures, including more information about organizations’ cybersecurity risk management 
programs and preventative actions taken to reduce and manage cybersecurity risk (SEC 2017b, 
2018a).   
Cybersecurity risk management examinations are classified as permitted non-audit 
services and organizations can obtain cybersecurity risk management examination services from 
their financial statement auditors, i.e., joint provisioning, or from a separate provider (U.S. 
Congress 2002; SEC 2003).3  Joint provisioning of cybersecurity risk management examinations 
could potentially have both functional and dysfunctional effects on the work performed by the 
audit firm.  The work performed in cybersecurity risk management examinations overlaps with 
the assurance work performed in integrated internal control over financial reporting (ICFR) and 
financial statements audits and the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) has 
emphasized the importance of auditors increasingly considering cybersecurity risks in the 
integrated audits (PCAOB 2016, 2018).4  This overlap between cybersecurity risk management 
                                                 
3 With the goal of improving auditor independence and financial reporting quality, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
(SOX) and related Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) rules: (1) banned audit firms from providing certain 
non-audit services such as financial information system design and implementation and internal audit services to 
audit clients; (2) increased disclosure requirements related to audit and non-audit services fees; and (3) required 
audit committees to pre-approve both audit and permitted non-audit services (U.S. Congress 2002; SEC 2003). 
There is no prohibition in SOX against the independent auditor also providing cybersecurity examination services. 
4 Not only is an understanding of the client’s business processes and information systems important in both 
cybersecurity examinations and ICFR audits, many entity-level controls, e.g., control environment, risk assessment 
procedures, monitoring, general computer controls, etc., are also important to understand and test in both 
cybersecurity examinations and ICFR audits.  PCAOB staff inspection briefs continue to highlight concerns about 
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examinations and the integrated audits and increased importance of cybersecurity risk in the 
integrated audits creates an opportunity for increased auditor competence from knowledge 
spillover effects and from making it more cost-effective to use specialists who are more 
competent.  The potential synergy between cybersecurity risk management examinations and the 
integrated audits is thus a functional effect of joint provisioning. 
On the other hand, the Investor Advisory Group of the PCAOB has raised concerns that 
the rise of non-audit services, including cybersecurity services, in the large public auditing firms 
is threatening auditor independence and increasing risks to nonprofessional investors (PCAOB 
2014).  Joint provisioning of cybersecurity risk management examinations could result in a 
dysfunctional effect if investors perceive an impairment in auditor independence from providing 
the non-audit service.  Given the overlap between cybersecurity risk management examinations 
and the integrated ICFR and financial statements audits that may result in increased auditor 
competence and the concern about auditor independence impairments, the cybersecurity context 
provides an interesting setting to examine investor perceptions of the functional and 
dysfunctional effects of joint provisioning.  In this study, I investigate the effect of joint 
compared to separate provisioning of cybersecurity risk management examinations on investor 
perceptions and decisions.    
The cybersecurity risk management examination context is also of interest given the 
potential for a subsequent cybersecurity incident5 and ensuing investor reactions.  The 
occurrence of a significant cybersecurity incident following a jointly provisioned cybersecurity 
                                                 
auditors’ procedures for assessing risks related to cybersecurity that could have an effect on the financial statements 
audit and how these risks are addressed, i.e., how engagement teams modify their audit approach based on these 
risks, including how changes are made to audit procedures to test ICFR (PCAOB 2016, 2018). 
5 Cybersecurity incidents are often highly publicized in the news, are increasing, and are required to be disclosed if 
material (SEC 2011, 2017a).  The consequences of cybersecurity incidents to investors can be significant as 
illustrated by Equifax’s stock falling 31% and losing over $5 billion in market value when the magnitude of 
Equifax’s 2017 cybersecurity breach was disclosed (Reklaitis 2017; SEC 2018b). 
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risk management examination could be perceived by investors as a negative signal not only of 
the quality of the cybersecurity risk management examination but also of the integrated ICFR 
and financial statements audits.  In the event of a subsequent cybersecurity incident, investor 
perceptions of the positive effects of increased competence from joint provisioning could be 
outweighed by perceptions of the negative effects of independence impairment from joint 
provisioning.  I examine if the effect of a subsequent cybersecurity incident on investor 
perceptions and decisions differs depending on whether the cybersecurity risk management 
examination is provisioned jointly or separately.   
Drawing on source credibility theory (Birnbaum and Stegner 1979), DeAngelo’s (1981) 
theoretical audit quality model, and Wallace’s (1987) information hypothesis I develop 
predictions for how and why joint provisioning and subsequent cybersecurity incidents impact 
investor perceptions and decisions.  I conduct an experiment using a 2 x 2 between-participant 
design and manipulate (1) cybersecurity examination provisioning type as joint or separate and 
(2) subsequent cybersecurity incident as a cybersecurity incident absent or present following the 
cybersecurity risk management examination disclosure.  I measure how my manipulations 
impact investors’ willingness to invest (e.g., Koonce and Lipe 2010; Elliott, Rennekamp, and 
White 2015; Asay, Libby, and Rennekamp 2018).  To understand why my manipulations impact 
willingness to invest, I measure perceptions of auditor independence (Beattie, Brandt, and 
Fearnley 1999; Lowe, Geiger, and Pany 1999; SEC 2001), auditor competence (Bassellier, 
Benbasat, and Reich 2003; AICPA 2016), and audit quality (Gaynor, Kelton, Mercer, and Yohn 
2016; PCAOB 2007).   
Consistent with my predictions that joint provisioning of the cybersecurity risk 
management examination creates an opportunity for increased auditor competence from 
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knowledge spillover effects, my results indicate that in the absence of a cybersecurity incident, 
investors’ perceptions of auditor competence are greater when the cybersecurity risk 
management examination is provisioned jointly compared to separately.  I also find that when 
the cybersecurity risk management examination is provisioned jointly, the negative signal of a 
subsequent cybersecurity incident reverses investors’ positive perceptions of competence and 
increases investors’ sensitivity to potential independence impairments.  Overall, my results 
indicate that investors are more willing to invest in a company when the cybersecurity risk 
management examination is provisioned separately compared to jointly – a finding that has 
important implications for public companies and their boards.   
This study makes three contributions.  First, I contribute to the growing literature related 
to cybersecurity.  Most of this work has been archival in nature and as such, has not been able to 
examine the effects of the AICPA’s new cybersecurity risk management examination reporting.  
Using an experimental method, I am able to examine a potentially important implication of how 
cybersecurity risk management examinations are provisioned.  Specifically, I find that investors 
are less willing to invest when the cybersecurity risk management examination is jointly 
compared to separately provisioned.   
Second, this paper contributes to the research stream on non-audit services by not only 
examining investor perceptions of joint provisioning of cybersecurity risk management 
examinations, a unique and emerging non-audit service not previously examined, but also by 
providing insights into the longstanding debate over the theorized competing (i.e., suppressing) 
effects of increased competence and decreased independence on audit quality.  Schneider, 
Church, and Ely (2006) highlight that future research should focus on specific types of non-audit 
services rather than the broad and varying non-audit services fee categories used in many prior 
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studies providing mixed results.  Interestingly, I find that the negative signal of a subsequent 
cybersecurity incident reverses investors’ positive perceptions of competence and increases 
investors’ sensitivity to potential independence impairments.  Further, both competence and 
independence perceptions have positive effects on perceptions of audit quality.  These results 
show that non-audit services are perceived differently depending on whether a negative signal of 
non-audit service quality is present and highlight the importance of measuring perceptions of 
both independence and competence when evaluating how non-audit services affect perceptions 
of audit quality. 
Third, this study contributes to purchasers of cybersecurity risk management 
examinations and informs regulators and standard setters by examining investors’ reactions to 
the AICPA’s recently adopted voluntary cybersecurity risk management examination reporting.  
My results indicate that it might be advantageous for purchasers of cybersecurity risk 
management examinations to provision the cybersecurity risk management examination 
separately from the audit due to the negative effect of joint provisioning on investors’ 
willingness to invest – an important finding given that cybersecurity has become a top concern 
for public companies and their boards (NACD 2017) who are looking to their auditors to provide 
cybersecurity services both within and outside the scope of the integrated ICFR and financial 
statements audits (AAA 2019).  My findings also provide insights to regulators and standard 
setters considering changes to the voluntary nature of provisioning guidelines of cybersecurity 
risk management examinations.  The PCAOB has emphasized the importance of auditors 
increasingly considering components of cybersecurity in the integrated ICFR and financial 
statements audits (PCAOB 2016, 2018), while also raising concerns that the rise of non-audit 
services, including cybersecurity services, is threatening auditor independence in the large public 
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auditing firms and increasing risks to nonprofessional investors (PCAOB 2014).  Despite 
investors’ perceptions of increased competence consistent with the opportunity for knowledge 
spillover, in the event of a cybersecurity incident investors’ perceptions of audit quality is 
reduced when the cybersecurity risk management examination is provisioned jointly.   
 
2.2 Theory and Hypotheses Development 
 
 
2.2.1 Background and Theoretical Foundation  
 
In order to understand how and why the joint provisioning of cybersecurity risk 
management examinations impacts investor perceptions and decisions I first discuss the debate in 
the literature regarding the positive (functional) and potentially negative (dysfunctional) effects 
of joint provisioning.  I then present the expected theoretical relations that together explain the 
overall effect of joint provisioning on investors’ willingness to invest.  
On one hand, non-audit services are typically conjectured to impair auditor independence 
in fact or appearance, presumably because the additional revenue increases the importance of the 
client to the auditor, i.e., economic dependence, making it more likely that the auditor will agree 
to management’s preferred positions, which in turn decreases audit quality (e.g., Frankel, 
Johnson, and Nelson 2002; Kinney, Palmrose, and Scholz 2004; Krishnan, Heibatollah, and 
Zhang 2005; Francis 2006; Francis and Ke 2006; Gaynor, McDaniel, and Neal, 2006; Khurana 
and Raman 2006; Srinidhi and Gul, 2007).  On the other hand, non-audit services are also 
conjectured to increase auditor competency and efficiency, presumably through knowledge 
spillover effects and increased use of specialists, which in turn increases audit quality (e.g., 
Simunic 1984; Whisenant, Sankaraguruswamy, and Raghunandan 2003; Kinney et al. 2004; 
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Robinson 2008; Lai and Krishnan 2009; Gleason and Mills 2011; Knechel and Sharma 2011; 
Krishnan and Yu 2011; Prawitt, Sharp, and Wood 2012; Koh, Rajgopal, and Srinivasan 2013). 
In support of the effects of independence and competence on audit quality, the theoretical 
model developed by DeAngelo (1981) explains that the quality of external assurance is impacted 
by two factors, the independence and competence of the assurance provider.  External assurance 
providers who are more independent and more competent provide higher quality external 
assurance.  Similarly, source credibility theory posits that individuals evaluate the credibility of 
an information source based on the potential bias from the source and the expertise of the source 
(Birnbaum and Stegner 1979).  Individuals’ use of credibility as a cognitive heuristic when 
evaluating new information has been supported in psychology research (e.g., Hovland, Janis, and 
Kelley 1953; Eagly, Wood, and Chaiken 1978; Chaiken and Maheswaran 1994) and in 
accounting research (e.g., Hirst, Koonce, and Simko 1995; Hirst, Koonce, and Miller 1999; 
Mercer 2004; Mercer 2005; DeZoort, Houston, and Hermanson 2003; Hodge, Hopkins, and Pratt 
2006; Kim, Green, and Johnstone 2016).  Together, the theoretical model developed by 
DeAngelo (1981) and source credibility theory (Birnbaum and Stegner 1979) suggest that 
individuals’ perceptions of assurance provider independence and competence are positively 
related to perceptions of external assurance quality. 
Consistent with Wallace’s (1987) information hypothesis stating that independent 
assurance reduces information asymmetry and uncertainty, external assurance quality has a 
positive impact on investor perceptions of the credibility of the subject matter and the extent to 
which investors rely on the subject matter in making valuation judgments (e.g., Libby 1979; 
Hodge 2001, Coram, Monroe, and Woodliff (2009).  In other words, assurance quality is 
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positively related to the extent to which investors react more positively to positive news and 
more negatively to negative news in their valuation judgments (Coram et al. 2009). 
 
 
2.2.2 The Effect of Jointly Provisioned Cybersecurity Examinations  
Following this theoretical foundation and background about the effects of joint 
provisioning of non-audit services, I expect that joint provisioning of cybersecurity risk 
management examinations will have a positive effect on perceptions of auditor competence, a 
negative effect on perceptions of auditor independence, and that perceptions of competence and 
independence will in turn have positive effects on perceptions on audit quality, which is 
positively related to valuation judgments (i.e., willingness to invest).  While these individual 
effects are supported directly by the theoretical foundation, it is less clear what the overall effect 
of joint provisioning will be on willingness to invest due to the competing positive effect of 
competence and negative effect of independence.  To make an overall prediction about the effect 
of joint provisioning on willingness to invest I next turn to prior literature.   
Prior research examining whether the provision of other non-audit services is associated 
with lower financial reporting and audit quality has yielded mixed results.  On one hand, non-
audit services are associated with lower financial reporting quality, including accruals (Frankel et 
al. 2002; Srinidhi and Gul, 2007) and restatements (Kinney et al. 2004), negative stock price 
reactions (Krishnan et al. 2005; Francis and Ke 2006) and higher cost of equity (Khurana and 
Raman 2006).  These results are consistent with auditor independence impairments due to joint 
provisioning having a stronger negative effect than the potential positive effect from increased 
competence.  On the other hand, research has found evidence of positive overall net effects 
associated with joint provisioning such as increased financial reporting and audit quality 
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(Robinson 2008; Gleason and Mills 2011), reduced audit reporting lags (Knechel and Sharma 
2011), lower accounting risk (Prawitt et al. 2012), and improved earnings quality (Koh et al. 
2013).  These findings suggest that in some settings, the positive effect from increased 
competence due to joint provisioning is stronger than the negative effect associated with auditor 
independence impairments. 
Schneider et al. (2006) suggests that the broad and varying non-audit services fee 
categories used in many prior studies have contributed to the mixed results and that the specific 
type of non-audit service and context is important.  In the cybersecurity context, there is a 
relatively substantial overlap between cybersecurity risk management examination procedures 
and integrated audit procedures.  In both cybersecurity risk management examinations and 
integrated audits, an understanding of the client’s business processes and information systems is 
important.  Similarly, many entity-level controls, e.g., control environment, risk assessment 
procedures, monitoring, general computer controls, etc., are important to understand and test in 
both cybersecurity risk management examinations and integrated audits.  Additionally, the 
PCAOB staff inspection briefs continue to highlight concerns about auditors’ procedures for 
assessing risks related to cybersecurity that could have an effect on the financial statements audit 
and how these risks are addressed, i.e., how engagement teams modify their audit approach 
based on these risks, including how changes are made to audit procedures to test ICFR (PCAOB 
2016; 2018).  Similarly, the Center for Audit Quality (CAQ) has also emphasized the importance 
of auditors considering components of cybersecurity in the integrated audits (CAQ 2016b).6 
                                                 
6 The CAQ issued guidance explaining that “auditing standards require the auditor to obtain an understanding of 
how the company uses IT and the impact of IT on the financial statements, the extent of the company’s automated 
controls as they relate to financial reporting, including the IT general controls that are important to the effective 
operation of automated controls, and the reliability of data and reports used in the audit that were produced by the 
company.  In assessing the risks of material misstatement to the financial statements—including IT risks resulting 
from unauthorized access—auditors are required to take into account their understanding of the company’s IT 
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The overlap between cybersecurity risk management examinations and integrated audits 
and the increased   importance of cybersecurity risk in the integrated audits provide a strong 
opportunity for knowledge spillover.  This overlap could result in greater synergy if a single firm 
performs both services, which could make it more cost-effective to use specialists who are more 
competent.  This overlap also increases the likelihood that the same group or individuals perform 
both services, resulting in greater knowledge spillover effects.  Consequently, the positive effects 
of having cybersecurity risk management examinations and integrated audits performed by the 
same firm could be stronger than the positive effects of joint provisioning of some other non-
audit services. 
To make a prediction as to whether perceptions of the positive effect associated with 
competence improvements will outweigh perceptions of the negative effect associated with 
independence impairments, I rely on Prawitt et al. (2012) who examine a setting where the 
overlap between the non-audit service and the audit is substantial.  Prawitt et al. (2012) show that 
pre-SOX Big N internal audit outsourcing (i.e., joint provisioning of internal audit non-audit 
services) is associated with lower accounting risk.  I note that Prawitt et al. (2012) employ a 
proxy for actual financial reporting and audit quality, whereas I measure investor perceptions, 
and the overlap in an internal audit outsourcing setting might arguably be even greater than in the 
cybersecurity risk management examination setting.  Still, their findings suggest that the positive 
effect from improvements in competence due to joint provisioning may be stronger than the 
negative effect from auditor independence impairments.   
Based on the strong opportunity for knowledge spillover, the increased importance of 
cybersecurity risk in the integrated audits (PCAOB 2016, 2018; CAQ 2016b), and the findings in 
                                                 
systems and controls.  If information about a material breach is identified, the auditor would need to consider the 
impact on financial reporting, including disclosures, and the impact on ICFR” (CAQ 2016b, 1). 
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Prawitt et al. (2012), I expect that when cybersecurity risk management examinations are jointly 
provisioned the theorized positive effect on competence will outweigh the theorized negative 
effect on independence.  Drawing again on DeAngelo’s (1981) theoretical audit quality model 
and source credibility theory (Birnbaum and Stegner 1979), I expect that, absent a cybersecurity 
incident, investors will perceive joint provisioning, due to the expected stronger effect on 
competence relative to independence, to result in perceptions of higher quality external 
assurance.  Drawing again on Wallace’s (1987) information hypothesis and prior literature (e.g., 
Libby 1979; Hodge 2001, Coram et al. 2009), perceptions of higher quality external assurance 
will lead to higher valuations judgments (e.g., willingness to invest).  My first hypothesis 
follows: 
H1: In the absence of a cybersecurity incident, investors will be more willing to invest 
when the cybersecurity examination is jointly compared to separately provisioned. 
 
 
2.2.3 The Impact of Subsequent Cybersecurity Incidents 
Cybersecurity incidents are often highly publicized in the news, are increasing, and are 
required to be disclosed if material (SEC 2011, 2017a).  Cybersecurity incidents can be costly in 
terms of remediation effort, system downtime, and damaged reputation and trust, which is likely 
why prior research has demonstrated a negative market reaction to reported cybersecurity 
incidents (e.g., Campbell, Gordon, Loeb, and Zhou 2003; Goel and Shawky, 2009; Gatzlaff and 
McCullough, 2010; Hinz, Nofer, Schiereck, and Trillig 2015).  Consistent with these archival 
findings, I expect a negative effect of a cybersecurity incident on willingness to invest. 
Additionally, a subsequent cybersecurity incident occurring after the issuance of the 
cybersecurity risk management examination report can provide a negative external signal to 
investors about external assurance quality.  If provisioned separately, a subsequent cybersecurity 
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incident should primarily provide a negative signal of cybersecurity risk management 
examination quality given that the cybersecurity risk management examination is not performed 
by the audit firm.  However, when the cybersecurity risk management examination is jointly 
provisioned, the signal could also reduce investors’ perceptions of the quality of the integrated 
audit work.  More specifically, I expect that a subsequent cybersecurity incident will send a 
negative signal of external assurance quality, increasing investors’ sensitivity to potential 
independence impairments and reducing investors’ perceptions of auditor competence, with 
these effects being revealed through a lower willingness to invest.   
Drawing again on DeAngelo’s (1981) theoretical audit quality model and source 
credibility theory (Birnbaum and Stegner 1979), in the event of a subsequent cybersecurity 
incident I expect that the negative signal of a subsequent cybersecurity incident will have a 
greater negative effect on investors’ perceptions of auditor competence and independence, 
resulting in a greater negative effect on perceptions of external assurance quality, when the 
cybersecurity risk management examination is provisioned jointly compared to separately.  
Drawing again on Wallace’s (1987) information hypothesis and prior literature (e.g., Libby 
1979; Hodge 2001, Coram et al. 2009), perceptions of external assurance quality will impact 
valuations judgments (e.g., willingness to invest).  Based on this discussion, I present the 
following hypotheses:    
H2a:  A subsequent cybersecurity incident will negatively impact willingness to invest. 
 
H2b:  A subsequent cybersecurity incident will have a negative effect on the relation 
between provisioning type and willingness to invest. 
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2.2.4 Perceptions of Competence, Independence, and Audit Quality 
Figure 2.1 presents my model of how jointly provisioned cybersecurity risk management 
examinations in the presence or absence of a cybersecurity incident affect investors’ willingness 
to invest through the perceptual variables of auditor competence, auditor independence, and audit 
quality.  I next explain my hypotheses in relation to this model. 
 
Perceptions of Competence and Independence.  The theoretical model developed by 
DeAngelo (1981) explains that the quality of external assurance is impacted by primarily two 
factors, the competence and independence of the assurance provider.  Similarly, source 
credibility theory posits that individuals evaluate the credibility of an information source based 
on the potential bias from the source and the expertise of the source (Birnbaum and Stegner 
1979).  Consistent with DeAngelo (1981) and source credibility theory (Birnbaum and Stegner 
1979), the longstanding debate over non-audit services has also focused primarily on two 
competing factors: competence and independence.  On one side of the debate, non-audit services 
increase auditor competence through knowledge spillover effects, while on the other side of the 
debate non-audit services impair auditor independence through economic dependence (e.g., 
Schneider et al. 2006).  Similar to some prior research on other non-audit services finding 
positive effects of joint provisioning (e.g., Prawitt et al. 2012), the cybersecurity risk 
management examination setting provides a strong opportunity for knowledge spillover due to 
the overlap between the cybersecurity risk management examination and the integrated ICFR 
and financial statements audits.  As discussed earlier and as conjectured earlier by research 
examining the net effect of non-audit services, I expect that investors will perceive joint 
provisioning to increase auditor competence (Robinson 2008; Lai and Krishnan 2009; Gleason 
and Mills 2011; Knechel and Sharma 2011; Prawitt et al. 2012; Koh et al. 2013) and that 
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investors will perceive joint provisioning to impair independence due to increased economic 
dependence on the client (Krishnan et al. 2005; Francis 2006; Francis and Ke 2006; Gaynor et al. 
2006; Khurana and Raman 2006; DeFond and Zhang 2014).  Accordingly, I present the 
following hypotheses: 
H3a:  In the absence of a cybersecurity incident, perceptions of competence will be 
greater when the cybersecurity examination is jointly compared to separately 
provisioned. 
 
H3b:  In the absence of a cybersecurity incident, perceptions of independence will be 
lower when the cybersecurity examination is jointly compared to separately 
provisioned. 
 
 
The Effect of a Subsequent Cybersecurity Incident.  When the cybersecurity risk 
management examination is jointly provisioned, I expect that a subsequent cybersecurity incident 
will send a negative signal of not only the cybersecurity risk management examination, but also 
of the integrated ICFR and financial statements audits.  Drawing again on DeAngelo’s (1981) 
theoretical audit quality model and source credibility theory (Birnbaum and Stegner 1979) I 
expect that investors will associate this negative signal with lower auditor competence and 
independence when the cybersecurity risk management examination is jointly provisioned.  That 
is, investors will no longer perceive a positive effect of knowledge spillover from joint 
provisioning and will also be more sensitive to independence impairment concerns from joint 
provisioning.  Therefore, I propose the following hypotheses: 
H4a:  A cybersecurity incident will have a negative effect on the relation between 
provisioning type and investors’ perceptions of auditor competence. 
 
H4b:  A cybersecurity incident will have a negative effect on the relation between 
provisioning type and investors’ perceptions of auditor independence. 
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Perceptions of Audit Quality.  The theoretical model developed by DeAngelo (1981) 
posits that the quality of external assurance is impacted by two factors, the independence and 
competence of the assurance provider.  Similarly, source credibility theory posits that individuals 
evaluate the credibility of an information source based on the potential bias from the source and 
the expertise of the source (Birnbaum and Stegner 1979).  Together, the theoretical model 
developed by DeAngelo (1981) and source credibility theory (Birnbaum and Stegner 1979) 
suggest that individuals’ perceptions of assurance provider independence and competence are 
positively related to perceptions of external assurance quality.  Although prior studies have not 
directly measured individual investors’ perceptions of both independence and competence and 
their effect on perceptions of audit quality, some support for these associations has been found in 
prior research (e.g., Swanger and Chewning 2001; Schneider et al. 2006; Prawitt, Smith, and 
Wood 2009; DeFond and Zhang 2014; Abbott, Daugherty, Parker, and Peters 2016).  
Accordingly, I present the following hypotheses:   
H5a:  Perceptions of competence are positively associated with perceptions of audit 
quality. 
 
H5b:  Perceptions of independence are positively associated with perceptions of audit 
quality. 
 
Consistent with Wallace’s (1987) information hypothesis stating that independent 
assurance reduces information asymmetry and uncertainty, external assurance quality has a 
positive impact on investor perceptions of the credibility of the subject matter and the extent to 
which investors rely on the subject matter in making valuation judgments (e.g., Libby 1979; 
Hodge 2001, Coram et al. 2009).  In other words, assurance quality is positively related to the 
extent to which investors react more positively to positive news and more negatively to negative 
news in their valuation judgments (Coram et al. 2009).  Given the positive news in my study, I 
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expect that perceptions of higher quality external assurance will lead to higher valuation 
judgments (e.g., willingness to invest).  Therefore, I present the last hypothesis:   
H6:  Perceptions of audit quality are positively associated with willingness to invest. 
 
2.3 Research Method 
 
 
2.3.1 Participants 
 
Participants are 106 M.B.A. and executive M.B.A. students at a major public university. 7 
On average, participants are 31 years old with 9.1 years of work experience.  Close to 52 percent 
of participants are female and 15 percent are executive M.B.A.s.  On average, participants have 
taken 3.8 accounting and finance courses and have purchased or sold individual stock or mutual 
funds 19.3 times.  Thus, the participants are appropriate proxies for nonprofessional investors.  
Further, 100 (95) percent of participants have made online (in-department store) purchases in the 
last three months and close to 47 percent of the participants have experienced online fraud or 
identity theft in the past.  Participants were randomly assigned across experimental conditions 
and spent on average 12.85 minutes on the experiment.8  Twelve (out of 106) participants that 
failed one or both of the manipulation check questions are included in my analyses as the results 
remain qualitatively similar if the participants are excluded.  
 
2.3.2 Experimental Task and Design 
I conduct an experiment using a 2 x 2 between-participant design and manipulate (1) 
cybersecurity examination provisioning type as joint or separate and (2) subsequent 
                                                 
7 Institutional Review Board approval was obtained prior to recruiting participants and collecting data.   
8 Participants in the four experimental conditions do not vary significantly along any of the demographic factors.  As 
a robustness check, I include all demographic factors, including investment experience and whether the participant is 
an M.B.A. or executive M.B.A. student, as covariates in my analyses, yielding qualitatively similar results.   
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cybersecurity incident as cybersecurity incident absent or present following the cybersecurity 
risk management examination disclosure.  The experiment is administered online through the 
Qualtrics software.  In step one, participants are presented with general background information 
about a fictitious company and a brief overview of stock and performance information, including 
sales, earnings, and analyst expectations.  The financial information is designed to be perceived 
as positive.  The participants are also provided information about the audit engagement, 
including the clean audit opinion and background information about the auditors.  The retail 
industry setting is held constant.  Comprehension check questions are used to ensure that 
participants attend to and understand the background information.  Participants are then asked to 
provide initial valuation judgments about investment attractiveness and investment likelihood.   
In step two of the experiment, the participants are first presented with information about 
the company’s decision to disclose information about their cybersecurity risk management 
program, the decision to hire an independent auditor to provide a cybersecurity risk management 
examination, the disclosure, and the cybersecurity risk management examination report.  The 
participants are randomly presented one of the four experimental conditions based on the two 
between-participant manipulations: (1) Joint Provision and No Cybersecurity Incident, (2) 
Separate Provision and No Cybersecurity Incident, (3) Joint Provision and Subsequent 
Cybersecurity Incident, and (4) Separate Provision and Subsequent Cybersecurity Incident.  The 
cybersecurity examination provisioning type manipulation (joint or separate provisioning) is 
administered in this step.  To make the manipulation salient, participants are explicitly told 
whether the service was performed by the existing integrated ICFR and financial statement 
auditors or by another Big 4 accounting firm.  The subsequent cybersecurity incident 
manipulation is also administered in this step.  In the no cybersecurity incident conditions, the 
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participants are explicitly told that, as of a particular date subsequent to the cybersecurity 
assurance report disclosure, no significant cybersecurity incident has occurred.  In the 
cybersecurity incident conditions, participants are instead told that, on a particular date (the same 
date as in the no incident conditions) subsequent to the cybersecurity risk management 
examination disclosure, a significant cybersecurity incident occurred.  
Participants are then asked to again provide valuation judgments about investment 
attractiveness and investment likelihood.  Participants also answer questions related to their 
perceptions of competence, independence, and audit quality.  In step three, participants answer 
post-experiment questions, including demographic and manipulation check questions.  
 
2.3.3 Dependent Variable 
Willingness to Invest.  I draw on prior research (e.g., Koonce and Lipe 2010; Elliott et al. 
2015; Asay et al. 2018) to create my valuation judgment measures.  Specifically, I use 
participants’ willingness to invest in the fictitious company Cost Saver as my dependent variable.  
I measure willingness to invest based on the average of participants’ perceptions of investment 
attractiveness and investment likelihood.  To measure investment attractiveness, I ask 
participants how attractive an investment in Cost Saver is on a 7-point Likert scale anchored on 1 
(very unattractive) and 7 (very attractive).  To measure investment likelihood, I ask participants, 
assuming they were given $10,000 to invest in the department store retail industry, how likely 
are they to invest a portion of this amount in Cost Saver on a 7-point Likert scale anchored on 1 
(very unlikely) and 7 (very likely).  I capture participants’ willingness to invest both before and 
after the experimental manipulations.  To remove noise introduced by individual participant 
idiosyncrasies, I control for pre-manipulation willingness to invest by using the difference 
between the post-manipulation and pre-manipulation measures as the dependent variable, similar 
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to prior research (e.g., Smith 2012, Asay et al. 2018; Koonce, Leitter, and White 2018).  A 
positive change in willingness to invest between the pre- and the post-manipulation measures 
indicates an increased willingness to invest.  For ease of exposition, I refer to the change in 
willingness to invest simply as willingness to invest. 
 
2.3.4 Other Measured Variables 
Perceptions of Independence.  I define auditor independence as “a mental state of 
objectivity and lack of bias (SEC 2001,1) and “acting with integrity and objectivity and being 
able to withstand pressure from management to infringe professional standards" (Beattie et al. 
1999, 79).9  Following Lowe et al. (1999), I measure perceptions of independence by asking 
participants how confident they are that the auditors acted independently when performing Cost 
Saver's financial statements and related internal controls audit, using a 7-point Likert scale 
anchored on 1 (No Confidence) and 7 (Extreme Confidence).  I also provide a definition of 
auditor independence to the participants: auditors are independent when they act with integrity 
and objectivity, and without biases, and when they do not give in to pressure from management.   
Perceptions of Competence.  I define competence as a construct consisting of knowledge 
and the ability to use this knowledge in a specific context (Bassellier et al. 2003).  Competence is 
similar to professional judgment, which is defined by the AICPA’s auditing standards as “the 
application of relevant training, knowledge, and experience, within the context provided by 
auditing, accounting, and ethical standards, in making informed decisions about the courses of 
                                                 
9 This definition of auditor independence is consistent with the AICPA’s auditing standards stating: “The auditor's 
independence from the entity safeguards the auditor's ability to form an audit opinion without being affected by 
influences that might compromise that opinion. Independence enhances the auditor's ability to act with integrity, to 
be objective, and to maintain an attitude of professional skepticism. Independence implies an impartiality that 
recognizes an obligation to be fair not only to management and those charged with governance of an entity but also 
users of the financial statements who may rely upon the independent auditor's report” (AICPA 2016, 93). 
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action that are appropriate in the circumstances of the audit engagement.” (AICPA 2016, 86).  I 
measure perceptions of competence by asking participants how confident they are in the 
auditors’ competence in Cost Saver's financial statements and related internal controls audit, on a 
7-point Likert scale anchored on 1 (No Confidence) and 7 (Extreme Confidence).  I also provide 
a definition of auditor competence to the participants:  Auditors are competent when they have 
relevant knowledge and the ability to use this knowledge in a specific auditing context.   
Perceptions of Audit Quality.  I develop my measure of perceptions of the quality of the 
integrated ICFR and financial statements audits based on Gaynor et al.’s (2016) definition of a 
high-quality audit as “…one that provides a higher level of assurance that the auditor obtained 
sufficient appropriate evidence that the financial statements faithfully represent the firm’s 
underlying economics” and a high-quality non-financial audit as “…one that is conducted in 
compliance with assurance standards and provides a greater level of assurance on the respective 
information opined” (5).  Using 7-point Likert scales anchored on 1 (No Confidence) and 7 
(Extreme Confidence), I ask participants how confident they are that sufficient evidence was 
obtained and used to support: (1) the auditors’ clean opinion that the financial statements 
faithfully represent Cost Saver’s underlying economics and (2) the auditors’ clean opinion that 
Cost Saver maintained effective internal controls over financial reporting (PCAOB 2007).  I then 
combine these two measures for an overall measure of perceptions of the quality of the 
integrated ICFR and financial statements audits. 
2.3.5 Pilot Study 
Participants were non-professional investors recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk 
(MTurk).10  Rennekamp (2012); Koonce, Miller, and Winchel (2015); Brasel, Doxey, Grenier 
                                                 
10 Institutional Review Board approval was obtained prior to recruiting participants and collecting data.   
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and Reffett (2016), Chen, Han, and Tan (2016), and Farrell, Grenier, and Leiby (2017) 
demonstrate the appropriateness of using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk participants in accounting 
experiments.  I enforced strict qualification requirements, including MTurk human intelligence 
task (HIT) approval ratings greater than 98 percent on at least 5,000 approved HITs, participants 
located in the U.S., and no duplicate IP addresses.  In order to incentivize effort and attention, I 
implemented a bonus payment structure as recommended by Buchheit, Doxey, Pollard, and 
Stinson (2018).  Participants earning a bonus took an average of 10.86 minutes to complete the 
experiment.  Close to 46 percent of participants were female and participants were on average 40 
years old with 18.5 years of work experience.  On average, participants had taken 2.2 accounting 
and finance courses and had purchased or sold individual stock or mutual funds 17 times.  Thus, 
the participants were an appropriate proxy for non-professional investors.  Participants had made 
an average of 4-6 online purchases and 4-6 in-department store purchases in the last three 
months and close to 28 percent of the participants had experienced online fraud or identity theft 
in the past.  
In summary, the results of the first experiment using MTurk participants showed that 
joint provisioning had a negative effect on investor perceptions of independence, without a 
corresponding positive effect on investor perceptions of competence.  I also found that the effect 
of a subsequent cybersecurity incident on investor perceptions of competence was significantly 
more negative for joint provisioning compared to separate provisioning.  The results of the first 
experiment using MTurk participants also showed no statistical difference between investors’ 
willingness to invest between joint provisioning and separate provisioning of the cybersecurity 
risk management examination.   
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Based on feedback from several reviewers and lessons learned, I made a number of 
changes after the first experiment using MTurk participants.  Namely, prior to collecting new 
data, I made changes to my manipulations to remove a potential priming effect, revised my 
hypothesized model based on a more coherent and integrated theoretical framework, and 
recruited M.B.A. and executive M.B.A. students with more investment experience than the 
MTurk participants to participate in a new experiment with a modified instrument. 
 
2.4 Results 
 
2.4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2.1 presents summary statistics for willingness to invest and perceptions of 
competence, perceptions of independence, and perceptions of audit quality by condition as well 
as mean comparisons between conditions.  Similar to prior research (e.g., Smith 2012, Asay et al. 
2018; Koonce, Leitter, and White 2018), willingness to invest is the change between the pre- and 
the post-manipulation measures.  A positive change in willingness to invest indicates an 
increased willingness to invest.11  Interestingly, comparisons of means indicate that in the 
absence of a subsequent cybersecurity incident, joint provisioning compared to separate 
provisioning has a negative effect on willingness to invest, (p<0.001), but a positive effect on 
perceptions of competence (p=0.077).  Comparisons of means also indicate that in the presence 
of a cybersecurity incident, joint provisioning compared to separate provisioning has a negative 
effect on perceptions of independence (p=0.026) and perceptions of audit quality (p=0.082).  
Additionally, comparisons of means indicate that a cybersecurity incident has a negative effect 
on willingness to invest for both joint provisioning and separate provisioning (p<0.001 and 
                                                 
11 Results from alternative analyses using the post-manipulation measure as the dependent variable and the pre-
manipulation measure as a covariate for hypotheses testing are qualitatively similar. 
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p<0.001), and a negative effect on perceptions of competence (p<0.001); perceptions of 
independence (p=0.001), and perceptions audit quality (p=0.005), but only for joint provisioning.   
 
2.4.2 Tests of Hypotheses  
Due to the strong opportunity for knowledge spillover effects and increased auditor 
competence, H1 predicts that in the absence of a cybersecurity incident, investors will be more 
willing to invest when the cybersecurity risk management examination is jointly provisioned 
compared to separately provisioned.  As shown in the ANOVA results in Table 2.2, investors are 
significantly less willing to invest when the cybersecurity risk management examination is 
jointly provisioned compared to separately provisioned (p=0.050; two-tailed), in the opposite 
direction as my prediction.  I explore this surprising result further when I test the links in my 
hypothesized model shown in Figure 2.1.   
H2a predicts that a subsequent cybersecurity incident will have a negative effect on 
willingness to invest and H2b predicts that a subsequent cybersecurity incident will also have a 
negative effect on the relation between joint provisioning and willingness to invest because a 
subsequent cybersecurity incident will reduce investors’ perceptions of auditor independence and 
competence when the services are jointly provisioned.  As shown in the ANOVA results in Table 
2.2, although I find a significant negative effect of a cybersecurity incident on willingness to 
invest (p<0.001), I do not find a significant interaction (p=0.271).  It is possible that because 
investors already perceived joint provisioning as negative, the negative signal from a 
cybersecurity incident did not further reduce investors’ perceptions of auditor independence and 
competence under joint provisioning compared to under separate provisioning. 
I next test my hypothesized model (H3 - H6) using PROCESS (Hayes 2018).  The results 
of the model tests are provided in Table 2.3 and depicted in Figure 2.2.   
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Due to the strong opportunity for knowledge spillover effects and increased auditor 
competence, H3a predicts that in the absence of a cybersecurity incident, perceptions of 
competence will be greater when the cybersecurity risk management examination is jointly 
provisioned compared to separately provisioned.  As hypothesized, the results indicate that in the 
absence of a cybersecurity incident, investors’ perceptions of auditor competence are more 
positive when the cybersecurity risk management examination is jointly provisioned compared to 
separately provisioned (p=0.047).  I also find support for the prediction in H4a that a subsequent 
cybersecurity incident has a negative effect on the relation between provisioning type and 
perceptions of competence (p=0.020).  The interaction suggests that when the cybersecurity risk 
management examination is jointly provisioned, the negative signal of a subsequent 
cybersecurity incident reverses investors’ positive perceptions of competence. 
I do not find support for H3b, which predicts that in the absence of a cybersecurity 
incident, perceptions of auditor independence are lower when the cybersecurity risk management 
examination is jointly provisioned compared to separately provisioned (p=0.469).  Absent a 
cybersecurity incident, it appears that perceptions of independence, typically theorized to explain 
why joint provisioning of non-audit services negatively affects perceptions of audit quality, does 
not explain why investors are less willing to invest when the cybersecurity risk management 
examination is jointly provisioned compared to separately provisioned. 
I do, however, find support for H4b, which predicts that a subsequent cybersecurity 
incident has a negative effect on the relation between provisioning type and perceptions of 
independence (p=0.043).  Further analysis indicates that when a cybersecurity incident is 
reported, the effect of joint provisioning on investor perceptions of independence is negative 
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(p=0.006), suggesting that investors are more sensitive to independence impairment concerns 
from joint provisioning in the event of a subsequent cybersecurity incident.   
The results also support H5a and H5b predicting that perceptions of competence and 
perceptions of independence are positively associated with perceptions of audit quality (p<0.001 
and p<0.001), and H6 predicting that perceptions of audit quality are positively associated with 
willingness to invest (p<0.001). 
 
2.4.3 Summary of Results 
 Table 2.4 provides a summary of my results.  The results show that in the absence of a 
subsequent cybersecurity incident investors are less willing to invest when the cybersecurity risk 
management examination in jointly provisioned compared to separately provisioned (contrary to 
H1).  The results also show that a subsequent cybersecurity incident has a negative impact on 
willingness to invest (H2a supported), but does not have a significant negative effect on the 
relation between provisioning type and willingness to invest (H2b not supported).   
I next explore whether my hypothesized model can help explain some surprising results.  
In the absence of a subsequent cybersecurity incident, joint provisioning has a positive effect on 
investors’ perceptions of auditor competence (H3a supported), but no significant effect on 
perceptions of auditor independence (H3b not supported).  Interestingly, the negative signal of a 
subsequent cybersecurity incident reverses investors’ positive perceptions of competence (H4a 
supported) and increases investors’ sensitivity to potential independence impairments (H4b 
supported).  Further, perceptions of competence and perceptions of independence have positive 
effects on perceptions of audit quality (H5a and H5b supported) which in turn has a positive 
effect on willingness to invest (H6 supported).  Although the hypothesized model I developed 
based on theory is largely supported by my results, it appears that investors’ willingness to invest 
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is also driven by factors not captured in my model.  My results suggest that the competing effects 
of competence and independence typically theorized to explain the effect of joint provisioning on 
various proxies of audit quality used in the non-audit services literature may not completely 
explain nonprofessional investors’ judgment and decision making, at least in the context of 
cybersecurity non-audit services. 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
In response to increased cybersecurity risks and the growing demand for information 
about organizations’ cybersecurity risk management programs, the AICPA recently released a 
cybersecurity risk management examination service designed to provide external assurance 
related to the effectiveness of organization’s cybersecurity controls (AICPA 2017a).  I report the 
results of an experiment designed to respond to the AICPA’s call for research that explores how 
users respond to cybersecurity risk management examination reporting (AAA 2017a; 2017b).  
My study is also motivated by recently expressed concerns by the SEC about cybersecurity 
threats facing nonprofessional (retail) investors and the need for more robust cybersecurity 
disclosures, including more information about organizations’ cybersecurity risk management 
programs and preventative actions taken to reduce and manage cybersecurity risk (SEC 2017b, 
2018a).   
Consistent with the theoretical argument that joint provisioning of the cybersecurity risk 
management examination creates a strong opportunity for increased auditor competence from 
knowledge spillover effects, my results indicate that in the absence of a cybersecurity incident, 
investors’ perceptions of competence are greater when the cybersecurity risk management 
examination is jointly compared to separately provisioned.  I also find that when the 
cybersecurity risk management examination is jointly provisioned, the negative signal of a 
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subsequent cybersecurity incident reverses investors’ positive perceptions of competence and 
increase investors’ sensitivity to potential independence impairments.  My results also indicate 
that investors are more willing to invest when the cybersecurity risk management examination is 
separately provisioned compared to jointly provisioned.   
This study makes three contributions.  First, I contribute to the growing literature related 
to cybersecurity.  Most of this work has been archival in nature and as such, has not been able to 
examine the effects of the AICPA’s new cybersecurity risk management examination reporting 
and the AICPA’s call for research that explores how users respond to cybersecurity risk 
management examination reporting (AAA 2017a, 2017b).  Using an experimental method, I am 
able to examine a potentially important implication of how cybersecurity risk management 
examinations are provisioned.  Specifically, I find that investors are less willing to invest when 
the cybersecurity risk management examination is jointly provisioned compared to separately 
provisioned.   
Second, this paper contributes to the research stream on non-audit services by not only 
examining investor perceptions of joint provisioning of cybersecurity risk management 
examinations, a unique and emerging non-audit service not previously examined, but also by 
providing insights into the longstanding debate over the theorized competing (i.e., suppressing) 
effects of increased competence and decreased independence on audit quality.  Schneider et al. 
(2006) highlight that future research should focus on specific types of non-audit services rather 
than the broad and varying non-audit services fee categories used in many prior studies providing 
mixed results.  In the absence of a subsequent cybersecurity incident, I find that joint 
provisioning has a positive effect on investors’ perceptions of auditor competence, but no 
significant effect on perceptions of auditor independence.  Interestingly, the negative signal of a 
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subsequent cybersecurity incident reverses investors’ positive perceptions of competence and 
increases investors’ sensitivity to potential independence impairments.  In other words, the effect 
of joint provisioning can have either positive or negative effects on perceptions of competence 
and either no significant effect or a negative effect on perceptions of independence depending on 
whether a negative signal of the quality of the non-audit service is present.  Further, as predicted 
by theory, both perceptions of competence and perceptions of independence have positive effects 
on perceptions of audit quality.  These results not only contribute to the non-audit services 
literature by showing how non-audit services are perceived differently depending on whether a 
negative signal of non-audit service quality is present, but the results also highlight the 
importance of measuring perceptions of independence and competence when examining how 
non-audit services affect perceptions of audit quality. 
Third, this study contributes to purchasers of cybersecurity risk management 
examinations and informs regulators and standard setters by examining investors’ reactions to 
the AICPA’s recently adopted voluntary cybersecurity risk management examination reporting.  
My results indicate that it might be advantageous for purchasers of cybersecurity risk 
management examinations to provision the cybersecurity risk management examination 
separately from the audit due to the negative effect of joint provisioning on investors’ 
willingness to invest - an important finding given that cybersecurity has become a top concern 
for public companies and their boards (NACD 2017) who are looking to their financial statement 
auditors to provide cybersecurity services both within and outside the scope of the integrated 
ICFR and financial statements audits (AAA 2019).   
My findings also provide insights to regulators and standard setters considering changes 
to the voluntary nature and provisioning guidelines of cybersecurity risk management 
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examinations.  The PCAOB has emphasized the importance of auditors increasingly considering 
components of cybersecurity in the integrated ICFR and financial statements audits (PCAOB 
2016, 2018) and public company auditors are concerned about investors’ increased expectations 
of the responsibilities of the audit firm in addressing cybersecurity risk (McKenna 2018; AAA 
2019).  At the same time, the PCAOB has also raised concerns that the rise of non-audit services, 
including cybersecurity services, is threatening auditor independence and increasing risks to 
nonprofessional investors (PCAOB 2014).  Similar independence concerns related to non-audit 
services are being raised by regulators in the UK (CMA 2018).  Moreover, the proposed law 
H.R.5069 (2016), the Cybersecurity Systems and Risks Reporting Act of 2016, has been 
introduced to amend the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and related SEC oversight to also apply to 
cybersecurity systems and cybersecurity systems officers.  Yet, my findings suggest that despite 
investors’ perceptions of increased competence consistent with knowledge spillover effects, in 
the event of a subsequent cybersecurity incident investors’ perceptions of audit quality is reduced 
when the cybersecurity risk management examination is performed jointly.  Given that 
cybersecurity incidents are common and can occur despite clean opinions from high quality 
cybersecurity risk management examinations, the increasing focus by regulators on cybersecurity 
controls in integrated ICFR and financial statements audits may have unforeseen negative 
effects, especially on nonprofessional investors that may misinterpret this less than perfect signal 
of audit quality.   
These observations should be interpreted in light of certain limitations, which also 
provide opportunities for future research.  First, similar to other nonprofessional investor 
experimental studies, participants in my study have a limited set of information compared to 
when investors make actual investment decisions, limiting the generalizability of the results.   
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Future research could examine whether professional investors react differently than 
nonprofessional investors to cybersecurity risk management examination and cybersecurity 
incident disclosures.  Second, I hold the retail industry constant in my study to control for 
industry effects and make the setting more salient to the participants.  Future research could 
examine whether cybersecurity risk management examination and cybersecurity incident 
disclosures impact investors’ perceptions and decisions differently by industry.  Third, I do not 
examine the perceived value of the AICPA’s new cybersecurity risk management examination 
compared to alternative cybersecurity assurance services available in the current voluntary and 
non-standardized cybersecurity assurance market and recommend that future research address 
this important question.  Fourth, although not within the scope of this study, future research 
could also examine investors’ perceptions of CPAs’ expertise in the context of cybersecurity risk 
management examinations.   
Finally, although the hypothesized model I developed based on theory is largely 
supported by my results, it appears that other non-modeled factors are also impacting investors’ 
willingness to invest.  My results suggest that the competing effects of competence and 
independence, typically theorized to explain the results of the net effects of joint provisioning on 
various proxies of audit quality used in the non-audit services literature may not completely 
explain nonprofessional investors’ judgment and decision making in the context of cybersecurity 
non-audit services in particular and non-audit services in general, providing another opportunity 
for future research.   
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2.6 Tables for Essay 1 
Table 2.1: Essay 1 Descriptive Statistics – Mean (Standard Deviation) 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: All p-values are reported two-tailed. 
Provisioning Type is manipulated as joint or separate provisioning of the cybersecurity examination and the 
integrated ICFR and financial statements audits (joint=1; separate=0). Cybersecurity Incident is manipulated as the 
presence or absence of a reported cybersecurity incident subsequent to the cybersecurity examination report date 
(incident=1; no incident=0).  Willingness to Invest is the change between the pre- and the post-manipulation 
measures. A positive change in Willingness to Invest indicates an increased willingness to invest. Willingness to 
Invest includes investment attractiveness and investment likelihood. Participants rate investment attractiveness on a 
seven-point scale with endpoints “very unattractive” and “very attractive.” Participants rate investment likelihood on 
a seven-point scale with endpoints “very unlikely” and “very likely.” Participants rate their confidence in the audit 
firm’s (1) Independence, (2) Competence, and (3) Audit Quality on seven-point scales with endpoints “No 
Confidence” and “Extreme Confidence.”   
Cybersecurity 
Examination 
Provisioning Type 
Subsequent Cybersecurity 
Incident 
  
Mean 
Comparison 
 No Incident Incident  Row Means 
 
p-value 
Joint     
Willingness to Invest -0.250 (0.752) -2.056 (1.565) -1.170 (1.525) <0.001 
Perceived Competence 5.731 (1.002) 4.370 (1.305) 5.038 (1.344) <0.001 
Perceived Independence 5.269 (1.251) 4.037 (1.372) 4.642 (1.442) 0.001 
Perceived Audit Quality 5.231 (1.125) 4.241 (1.310) 4.726 (1.310) 0.005 
 n = 26 n = 27 n = 53  
     
Separate     
Willingness to Invest 0.463 (0.587) -1.654 (1.880) -0.575(1.736) <0.001 
Perceived Competence 5.148 (1.322) 4.808 (1.357) 4.981 (1.337) 0.359 
Perceived Independence 5.296 (0.993) 4.923 (1.440) 5.113 (1.235) 0.276 
Perceived Audit Quality 5.111 (0.923) 4.885 (1.329) 5.000 (1.135) 0.473 
 n = 27 n = 26 n = 53  
     
Column Means Grand Means  
Willingness to Invest 0.113 (0.757) -1.858 (1.722) -0.873 (1.653)  
Perceived Competence 5.434 (1.201) 4.585 (1.336) 5.009 (1.334)  
Perceived Independence 5.283 (1.116) 4.472 (1.462) 4.877 (1.357)  
Perceived Audit Quality 5.170 (1.019) 4.557 (1.347) 4.863 (1.228)  
  n = 53 n = 53 n = 106  
    
 
 p-value p-value   
Willingness to Invest <0.001 0.401   
Perceived Competence 0.077 0.237   
Perceived Independence 0.931 0.026   
Perceived Audit Quality  0.673 0.082   
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Table 2.2: The Effect of Provisioning Type and Cybersecurity Incident on Willingness to 
Invest 
 
Panel A:  ANOVA 
Source df MS F p-value 
     
Provisioning Type 1 8.229 4.792 0.031 
Cybersecurity Incident (H2a) 1 101.889 59.340 < 0.001 
Provisioning Type X Cybersecurity Incident (H2b) 1 0.642 0.374 0.271 
Error 102    
  
 
Panel B:  Planned Comparison 
Relation  df F-stat p-value      
Separate > Joint for No Incident (H1)  1 3.921 0.050*
  
Notes: P-values are reported one-tailed when the path coefficient is in the expected direction, otherwise two-tailed. 
Provisioning Type is manipulated as joint or separate provisioning of the cybersecurity examination and the 
integrated ICFR and financial statements audits. Cybersecurity Incident is manipulated as the presence or absence of 
a reported cybersecurity incident subsequent to the cybersecurity examination report date. Willingness to Invest is 
the change between the pre- and the post-manipulation measures. A positive change in Willingness to Invest 
indicates an increased willingness to invest. Willingness to Invest includes investment attractiveness and investment 
likelihood. Participants rate investment attractiveness on a seven-point scale with endpoints “very unattractive” and 
“very attractive.” Participants rate investment likelihood on a seven-point scale with endpoints “very unlikely” and 
“very likely.”  
*Result is significant in the opposite direction as predicted, two-tailed. 
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Table 2.3: Results of Hypothesized Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: P-values are reported one-tailed when the path coefficient is in the expected direction, otherwise two-tailed. 
Provisioning Type is manipulated as joint or separate provisioning of the cybersecurity examination and the integrated ICFR and financial statements 
audits (joint=1; separate=0). Cybersecurity Incident is manipulated as the presence or absence of a reported cybersecurity incident subsequent to the 
cybersecurity examination report date (incident=1; no incident=0).  Willingness to Invest is the change between the pre- and the post-manipulation 
measures. A positive change in Willingness to Invest indicates an increased willingness to invest. Willingness to Invest includes investment attractiveness 
and investment likelihood. Participants rate investment attractiveness on a seven-point scale with endpoints “very unattractive” and “very attractive.”  
Participants rate investment likelihood on a seven-point scale with endpoints “very unlikely” and “very likely.”  Participants rate their confidence in the 
audit firm’s (1) Independence, (2) Competence, and (3) Audit Quality on seven-point scales with endpoints “No Confidence” and “Extreme Confidence.”  
 
  
Path Coefficient  p-value 
Provisioning Type  Perceived Competence (H3a) 0.583 0.047 
Provisioning Type   Perceived Independence (H3b) -0.027 0.469 
Provisioning Type and Cybersecurity Incident Interaction   Perceived Competence (H4a) -1.020 0.020 
Provisioning Type and Cybersecurity Incident Interaction   Perceived Independence (H4b) -0.859 0.043 
Perceived Competence   Perceived Audit Quality (H5a) 0.437 <0.001 
Perceived Independence   Perceived Audit Quality (H5b) 0.401 <0.001 
Perceived Audit Quality  Willingness to Invest (H6) 0.384 <0.001 
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Table 2.4: Summary of Hypotheses Testing 
 
Hypothesis p-value Result 
    
H1: In the absence of a cybersecurity incident, investors will be more willing to invest when 
the cybersecurity examination is jointly compared to separately provisioned. 
0.050 Not Supported* 
H2a: A subsequent cybersecurity incident will negatively impact willingness to invest. < 0.001 Supported 
H2b: A subsequent cybersecurity incident will have a negative effect on the relation between 
provisioning type and willingness to invest. 
0.271 Not Supported 
H3a: In the absence of a cybersecurity incident, perceptions of competence will be greater 
when the cybersecurity examination is jointly compared to separately provisioned. 
0.047 Supported 
H3b: In the absence of a cybersecurity incident, perceptions of independence will be lower 
when the cybersecurity examination is jointly compared to separately provisioned. 
0.469 Not Supported 
H4a: A cybersecurity incident will have a negative effect on the relation between provisioning 
type and investors’ perceptions of auditor competence. 
0.020 Supported 
H4b: A cybersecurity incident will have a negative effect on the relation between provisioning 
type and investors’ perceptions of auditor independence. 
0.043 Supported 
H5a: Perceptions of competence are positively associated with perceptions of audit quality. <0.001 Supported 
H5b: Perceptions of independence are positively associated with perceptions of audit quality. <0.001 Supported 
H6: Perceptions of audit quality are positively associated with willingness to invest. <0.001 Supported 
    
    
    
Notes: P-values are reported one-tailed when the path coefficient is in the expected direction, otherwise two-tailed. 
*Result is significant in the opposite direction as predicted, two-tailed. 
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2.7 Figures for Essay 1 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Hypothesized Model 
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Figure 2.2: Hypotheses Results with Path Coefficients (p-values) 
Notes: All p-values are reported one-tailed. Analyses are performed using PROCESS (Hayes 2018) with 5,000 bootstrap samples and 95% level of confidence.  
Provisioning Type is manipulated as joint or separate provisioning of the cybersecurity examination and the integrated ICFR and financial statements audits 
(joint=1; separate=0). Cybersecurity Incident is manipulated as the presence or absence of a reported cybersecurity incident subsequent to the cybersecurity 
examination report date (incident=1; no incident=0). Willingness to Invest is the change between the pre- and the post-manipulation measures. A positive change 
in Willingness to Invest indicates an increased willingness to invest. Willingness to Invest includes investment attractiveness and investment likelihood. 
Participants rate investment attractiveness on a seven-point scale with endpoints “very unattractive” and “very attractive.” Participants rate investment likelihood 
on a seven-point scale with endpoints “very unlikely” and “very likely.” Participants rate their confidence in the audit firm’s (1) Independence, (2) Competence, 
and (3) Audit Quality on seven-point scales with endpoints “No Confidence” and “Extreme Confidence.”  
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Chapter 3. Essay 2: The Impact of the Type of Cybersecurity Assurance Service and 
Cybersecurity Incidents on Investor Perceptions and Decisions 
2.8 Introduction 
As the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) noted recently, “Cybersecurity is 
critical to the operations of our markets and the risks are significant” (SEC 2017a, 1).  
Cybercrime can result in reputational damage, loss of proprietary information, revenue loss, 
government fines, litigation expenses, increased insurance premiums, and incident response and 
mitigation expenses (SEC 2018a; CAQ 2016).  With the goal of providing more complete and 
useful information to investors, the SEC recently issued guidance for public company 
cybersecurity disclosures highlighting the importance of information about organizations’ 
cybersecurity risk management programs and “…the adequacy of preventative actions taken to 
reduce cybersecurity risks” (SEC 2018a, 14).   
In response to heightened attention to cybersecurity risk, the American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) has released a new examination service designed to 
provide external assurance for organizations’ cybersecurity risk management programs (AICPA 
2017a, 2018).12  The cybersecurity risk management examination is a voluntary, general-use 
report that is intended to benefit a broad range of potential users including investors and other 
stakeholders such as customers, analysts, directors, business partners, and regulators (AICPA 
                                                 
12 A cybersecurity risk management program is a “…set of policies, processes, and controls designed to protect 
information and systems from security events that could compromise the achievement of the entity’s cybersecurity 
objectives and to detect, respond to, mitigate, and recover from, on a timely basis, security events that are not 
prevented” (AICPA 2017b, 207). 
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2017a).13  The top six audit firms are currently advertising their cybersecurity risk management 
examination service offerings and public company boards are increasingly requesting 
cybersecurity assurance services (Deloitte 2018a; AAA 2019). 
The current voluntary cybersecurity assurance reporting market includes many alternative 
third-party assurance services and providers (Kuranda 2017) and disparate assurance programs 
and frameworks with no widely accepted standard (AICPA 2017a).  For example, cybersecurity 
assurance services can differ in terms of the comprehensiveness of the subject matter (AICPA 
2017b).  A more comprehensive cybersecurity risk management examination includes all 
components of a cybersecurity risk management program such as the nature of business 
operations and information at risk, cybersecurity objectives, risk assessments, governance 
structure, communications, monitoring, and control processes (AICPA 2017b).  Each component 
further consists of a number of controls that are examined.  For example, vulnerability and 
penetration tests are included as a single control within the monitoring and risk assessment 
component of a cybersecurity risk management program (AICPA 2017b).  Yet, vulnerability and 
penetration tests are offered by various vendors as a standalone service.  Stakeholders may have 
difficulty distinguishing between the comprehensiveness of alternative cybersecurity assurance 
services and may even perceive a vulnerability and penetration test as equally or perhaps more 
valuable than a cybersecurity risk management examination.  Moreover, prior research 
examining another AICPA IT-related voluntary assurance reporting initiative called WebTrust 
that did not gain any significant market acceptance find that information users do not recognize 
                                                 
13 System and Organization Controls (SOC) for Cybersecurity examinations include three components: (1) 
management’s description of the cybersecurity risk management program, (2) management’s assertion that the 
description is presented in accordance with the description criteria and that the controls within the program were 
effective based on the control criteria, and (3) the CPA’s opinion on management’s description and the effectiveness 
of the controls within the program (AICPA 2017a). 
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the value of the more comprehensive external assurance services relative to less comprehensive 
external assurance alternatives (Mauldin and Arunachalam 2002; Gendron and Barrett 2004).  
Accordingly, the first objective of this study is to examine the impact of the type of voluntary 
external cybersecurity assurance service on investors’ perceptions and decisions. 
Cybersecurity incidents are increasingly prevalent and “no company or organization is 
immune from cyberattack” (SEC 2018b, 1).  The average cost of cybercrime has increased 62 
percent over the last five years and cybercrime continues to become more sophisticated 
(Accenture 2017).  In the context of cybersecurity assurance disclosures, previous cybersecurity 
incidents are likely to affect investors’ perceptions of the importance of the type of external 
assurance provided and in turn investors’ perceptions and decisions.  More specifically, if a 
cybersecurity incident precedes the external cybersecurity assurance (i.e., obtaining the 
cybersecurity external assurance is in response to a significant cybersecurity incident), investors 
may view the cybersecurity assurance service as a post-hoc reactive measure and may therefore 
be more sensitive to the type of external assurance service provided.  In the presence of a 
previous cybersecurity incident, a more comprehensive cybersecurity assurance service might 
increase investors’ perceptions of the company’s ability to not only prevent future cybersecurity 
incidents, but also to recover from future cybersecurity incidents that are not prevented.14  
Therefore, the second objective of this study is to examine the effect of a previous cybersecurity 
incident on the relation between the type of cybersecurity assurance service and investors’ 
perceptions and decisions. 
                                                 
14 SEC Chairman Clayton underscores the importance of both preventive and reactive measures to reduce 
cybersecurity risk and states that “we also must recognize…that there will be intrusions, and that a key component 
of cyber risk management is resilience and recovery.” (SEC 2017a, 1) 
44 
 
I draw on dual processing theories (Chaiken 1980; Petty and Cacioppo 1986; Chaiken 
and Maheswaran 1994; Kahneman 2003), the management disclosure credibility framework 
(Mercer 2004), and the information hypothesis (Wallace 1987) to develop hypotheses regarding 
the impact of the type of cybersecurity assurance service on investors’ willingness to invest, the 
potential positive moderating effect of a previous cybersecurity incident, and the potential 
mediating effect of perceptions of cybersecurity assurance services quality.  To test my 
hypotheses, I conduct an experiment using a 2 x 2 between-participant design, in which I 
manipulate type of cybersecurity assurance service as a more comprehensive cybersecurity risk 
management examination or a less comprehensive vulnerability and penetration test and 
cybersecurity incident as no incident or incident precedes assurance.  I measure the effect of 
these manipulations on willingness to invest, perceptions of cybersecurity assurance services 
quality, and perceptions of management credibility.   
Participants in the study are nonprofessional (i.e., retail) investors because the SEC is 
concerned about the “risks to retail investors in today’s marketplace” (SEC 2017b) and 
“protecting retail investors is at the heart of the Commission’s mission” (SEC 2018c).  The 
importance of examining nonprofessional investors’ perceptions of cybersecurity assurance 
disclosures is underscored by the SEC’s concern for the grave cybersecurity threats facing the 
“investing public” and the need for more robust cybersecurity disclosures (SEC 2018a, 2).  In 
addition, cybersecurity incidents involving the theft of sensitive customer information are often 
highly publicized leading to nonprofessional investors’ heightened awareness of cybersecurity 
risk.15  Nonprofessional investors’ awareness of cybersecurity risk is further heightened as their 
                                                 
15 Cybersecurity incidents are increasing in both numbers and economic significance and are required to be 
disclosed if material (SEC 2011, 2018a).    
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personal information and devices are increasingly digitally connected and susceptible to 
cybersecurity threats (e.g., NCSA 2017; SEC 2017c) 
I find that investors are more willing to invest when management disclosures describe a 
more comprehensive cybersecurity risk management examination rather than a less 
comprehensive vulnerability and penetration test.  This result is significant both in the absence of 
a cybersecurity incident and when a cybersecurity incident precedes cybersecurity assurance.  I 
also find that investors’ perceptions of cybersecurity assurance services quality mediate the 
relation between type of cybersecurity assurance service and willingness to invest.  Additional 
analyses suggest that a more comprehensive assurance service results in higher perceptions of 
cybersecurity assurance services quality because of the perception that the company is more 
prepared to recover from future cybersecurity incidents that are not prevented.  The results also 
show that higher perceptions of cybersecurity assurance services quality have a positive effect on 
investor perceptions of management credibility, which in turn has a positive effect on willingness 
to invest.   
This study makes three contributions to research and practice.  First, I contribute to the 
growing literature related to cybersecurity disclosures.  Using an experimental method, I am able 
to examine the effect of the AICPA’s new cybersecurity risk management examination in 
comparison to competing external assurance services on investors’ perceptions of cybersecurity 
assurance service quality and answer the AICPA’s call for research on how users react to 
cybersecurity assurance reporting (AAA 2017a, 2017b).  I also shed light on investors’ 
perceptions of important aspects of cybersecurity risk management assurance in terms of a 
company’s ability to not only prevent future cybersecurity incidents, but also to recover from 
future cybersecurity incidents that are not prevented.   
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Second, I contribute to the voluntary assurance disclosure literature by examining 
investor reactions to management disclosures of alternative types of voluntary external 
cybersecurity assurance service, beyond a comparison of the absence or presence of external 
assurance reports provided by CPAs previously examined in other non-financial voluntary 
assurance settings.  My results show that the comprehensiveness of the voluntary assurance 
service disclosed by management affects users’ judgments and decisions.  I also find that 
management’s choice to acquire a more comprehensive cybersecurity assurance service has a 
positive effect on investors’ perceptions of management credibility, which in turn has a positive 
effect on investors’ willingness to invest.   
Third, this study makes an important contribution to practice.  The new cybersecurity risk 
management examination service shares many features with the WebTrust service that did not 
gain much traction in the market.  For example, both WebTrust and cybersecurity risk 
management examinations are designed and promoted by the AICPA as a voluntary assurance 
service over IT related controls and face competition from less comprehensive and less costly 
assurance service alternatives in a voluntary and non-standardized assurance market.  However, 
despite the limited success of WebTrust, my results suggest that nonprofessional investors are 
sensitive to the type of cybersecurity assurance service provided, and companies can benefit 
from investing in more comprehensive cybersecurity risk management assurance services.  This 
is an important finding given that cybersecurity has become a top concern for public companies 
and their boards who are increasingly looking to CPA firms to provide cybersecurity assurance 
services (AICPA 2018; Deloitte 2018a; EY 2018; AAA 2019). 
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2.9 Theory and Hypotheses Development 
 
3.2.1 External Assurance  
Mercer’s (2004) management disclosure credibility framework explains that investors’ 
perceptions of external assurance, management credibility, and contextual factors together effect 
investors’ valuation judgments.  Consistent with source credibility theory (Birnbaum and Stegner 
1979) and the importance of the credibility of a message’s source, Mercer’s (2004) management 
disclosure credibility framework suggests that external assurance supporting a management 
disclosure affects investors’ perceptions of disclosure credibility and the extent to which 
investors rely on the disclosure for valuation judgments.  For example, prior research finds that 
users perceive management disclosures with external assurance reports as more credible than 
management disclosures without external assurance reports (e.g., Libby 1979; Blackwell, 
Noland, and Winters 1998; Hodge 2001).   
   Based on Mercer’s (2004) management disclosure credibility framework and Wallace’s 
(1987) information hypothesis explaining that external assurance reduces information asymmetry 
and uncertainty, Coram, Monroe, and Woodliff (2009) find that the presence of an external 
assurance report is particularly important if financial statement users perceive management 
disclosures of non-financial information to be incentive-consistent (i.e., if the disclosure could be 
perceived as self-serving).16  Prior research examining voluntary corporate social responsibility 
reporting similarly finds that nonprofessional investors and financial analysts perceive 
managements’ incentive-consistent corporate social responsibility disclosures as more credible in 
the presence versus absence of external assurance reports (Pflugrath, Roebuck, and Simnett 
                                                 
16 Given the voluntary nature of cybersecurity external assurance disclosures, cybersecurity external assurance 
disclosures are unlikely to contain negative news and are likely to be perceived as incentive consistent.   
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2011).  This research also shows that the presence of external assurance reports has a positive 
effect on stock price assessments (Brown-Liburd and Zamora 2014) and willingness to invest 
(Cheng, Green, and Ko 2015).  However, prior research has not examined the impact of the 
AICPA’s new cybersecurity risk management examination service in comparison to alternative 
voluntary assurance services available in the current voluntary and non-standardized 
cybersecurity assurance market. 
Findings from prior literature examining an earlier AICPA IT-related voluntary assurance 
reporting initiative called WebTrust provide insights.  In 1997, the AICPA launched WebTrust, a 
third-party web assurance seal for business-to-consumer e-commerce, as an opportunity to build 
on CPA’s expertise in audit and assurance (Elliott 1998; Gendron and Barrett 2004).  Although 
WebTrust provided a significantly more comprehensive assurance service than alternative third-
party web assurance seals such as TRUSTe (sponsored by IBM and Microsoft) and BBBOnLine 
(sponsored by the Better Business Bureau), WebTrust “failed to generate support in the 
marketplace” (Gendron and Barrett 2004, 563).  The alternative services were not only less 
expensive and easier for management to obtain, but consumers were also not sensitive to the type 
of assurance service provided by the different web assurance seals and did not recognize the 
value provided by WebTrust in terms of being a more comprehensive assurance services 
(Mauldin and Arunachalam 2002; Gendron and Barrett 2004; Bahmanziari, Odom, and Ugrin 
2009).  Although the WebTrust service “largely failed” (Gendron and Barrett 2004, 594), its 
principles and criteria evolved and contributed to the current Trust Services Criteria used for 
SOC assurance services (AICPA 2018). 
Similar to the voluntary e-commerce assurance market when WebTrust was launched, the 
current cybersecurity assurance market includes many alternative third-party assurance services 
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and providers (Kuranda 2017) and disparate cybersecurity assurance programs and frameworks 
with no widely accepted standard (AICPA 2017a).  For example, cybersecurity assurance 
services can differ in terms of the comprehensiveness of the subject matter (AICPA 2017b).  A 
more comprehensive cybersecurity risk management examination includes all components of a 
cybersecurity risk management program such as the nature of business operations and 
information at risk, cybersecurity objectives, risk assessments, governance structure, 
communications, monitoring, and control processes (AICPA 2017b).  Each component further 
consists of a number of controls that are examined in the AICPA’s cybersecurity risk 
management examination.  Vulnerability and penetration tests, for example, are included as a 
single control within the monitoring and risk assessment component of a cybersecurity risk 
management program (AICPA 2017b).  However, less comprehensive vulnerability and 
penetration tests are offered by various vendors as a standalone service.  In the context of 
cybersecurity, an investor may have difficulties in distinguishing the comprehensiveness of 
alternative services and may even perceive a vulnerability and penetration test as equally or 
perhaps more valuable than a cybersecurity risk management examination. 
Although many similarities exist between the web assurance context and the 
cybersecurity assurance context in terms of alternative types of voluntary assurance services, one 
difference between the web assurance context and the cybersecurity assurance context is that 
consumers are protected by credit card security guarantees from fraudulent transactions when 
making online purchases (Mauldin and Arunachalam 2002; Kim, Steinfield, and Lai 2008).  
Consequently, although consumers’ private information is at risk, online consumers may be less 
sensitive to the type of assurance service provided relative to nonprofessional investors who are 
not protected from stock price declines.  Another difference between the web assurance and 
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cybersecurity assurance contexts is that nonprofessional investors have a heightened awareness 
of cybersecurity risk because cybersecurity incidents involving the theft of sensitive customer 
information are often highly publicized and nonprofessional investors’ personal information and 
devices are increasingly digitally connected and susceptible to cybersecurity threats (e.g., SEC 
2017c; 2018b).  Given these distinctions, I expect that investors will differentiate between 
alternative cybersecurity assurance services that vary in terms of the comprehensiveness of the 
assurance service provided.  Drawing again on Mercer’s (2004) management disclosure 
credibility framework and Wallace’s (1987) information hypothesis explained above, more 
comprehensive external assurance services will increase investors’ valuation judgments (e.g., 
willingness to invest).  Accordingly, I present the following hypothesis: 
H1:  In the absence of a cybersecurity incident, investors are more willing to invest in the 
presence of a more compared to less comprehensive cybersecurity assurance service. 
 
 
3.2.2 Cybersecurity Incidents 
Cybersecurity incidents are increasing in both numbers and economic significance and 
are required to be disclosed if material (SEC 2011, 2018a).  Prior archival research finds a 
negative market reaction to reported cybersecurity incidents (e.g., Campbell, Gordon, Loeb, and 
Zhou 2003; Goel and Shawky, 2009; Gatzlaff and McCullough, 2010; Hinz, Nofer, Schiereck, 
and Trillig 2015).  In the context of cybersecurity disclosures, previous cybersecurity incidents 
are likely to also affect investors’ perceptions of the importance of the type of external assurance 
provided and in turn investors’ willingness to invest.  More specifically, if a cybersecurity 
incident precedes the external cybersecurity assurance (i.e., obtaining the cybersecurity external 
assurance is in response to a significant cybersecurity incident), investors may be more sensitive 
to the type of external assurance provided and a more comprehensive assurance service might 
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increase investors’ perceptions of the company’s ability to not only prevent but also recover from 
future cybersecurity incidents.  To support this conjecture, I draw on dual processing theories to 
explain how nonprofessional investors process types of external cybersecurity assurance services 
disclosures in the presence versus absence of a cybersecurity incident.    
Dual processing theories differentiate between simple heuristic processing (i.e., 
peripheral route or system one processing) and effortful systematic processing (i.e., central route 
or system two processing) (Chaiken 1980; Petty and Cacioppo 1986; Chaiken and Maheswaran 
1994; Kahneman 2003).  In heuristic processing, individuals rely on easily accessible cues (e.g. 
source credibility) to reduce information processing demands when evaluating new information 
(Birnbaum and Stegner 1979; Chaiken 1980; Petty and Cacioppo 1986; Chaiken and 
Maheswaran 1994; Kahneman 2003).  In systematic processing (i.e., central route or system two 
processing) individuals have the motivation and ability to use more effortful processing and are 
more likely to actively attend to the content of the information (i.e., message) being processed 
(Chaiken 1980; Petty and Cacioppo 1986; Chaiken and Maheswaran 1994; Kahneman 2003).   
Contextual variables can influence individuals’ motivation to engage in effortful 
systematic processing beyond simple heuristic processing (Chaiken 1980; Petty and Cacioppo 
1986; Chaiken and Maheswaran 1994; Kahneman 2003).  Consistent with dual processing 
theories, prior research in accounting has found that contextual factors can motivate individuals 
to engage in effortful systematic processing for example in the context of auditor performance 
reviews (Brazel, Agoglia, and Hatfield 2004), performance-based contracts (Farrell, Goh, and 
White 2014), and auditing of complex estimates (Griffith 2018). 
Applying dual processing theories to the cybersecurity disclosure setting, in the absence 
of a cybersecurity incident, nonprofessional investors are more likely to engage in simple 
52 
 
heuristic processing and rely primarily on easily accessible cues resulting in less sensitivity to the 
type of external cybersecurity assurance service.  However, a contextual variable such as a 
cybersecurity incident can motivate investors to engage in effortful systematic processing 
resulting in increased attention to the information about the cybersecurity assurance service 
provided, including the details of the comprehensiveness of the cybersecurity assurance 
provided.  Drawing again on Mercer’s (2004) management disclosure credibility framework and 
Wallace’s (1987) information hypothesis, more comprehensive external assurance services 
impact investors’ valuation judgments (e.g., willingness to invest).  Based on this discussion, I 
present the following hypothesis: 
H2:  The difference between willingness to invest in the presence of more and less 
comprehensive cybersecurity assurance services will be greater when a cybersecurity 
incident precedes cybersecurity assurance than in the absence of an incident.  
 
 
3.2.3 Perceptions of Cybersecurity Assurance Services Quality 
As discussed earlier, Mercer’s (2004) disclosure credibility framework suggests that 
external assurance supporting a management disclosure affects investors’ perceptions of the 
credibility of management disclosures and in turn investors’ valuation judgments.  Consistent 
with Mercer (2004), in order for the type of external cybersecurity assurance service to influence 
investors’ willingness to invest, investors must indeed perceive the external assurance service 
associated with the management disclosure to be of high assurance quality.  
The experimental method provides an opportunity to directly measure investors’ 
perceptions of cybersecurity assurance services quality and to examine whether this important 
intervening variable explains why a particular relation exists.  For example, Smith (2012) directly 
measures investors’ perceptions of audit quality and finds that this intervening variable mediates 
the relation between changes in auditing standards and investors’ investment allocations.  
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Gimbar, Hansen, and Ozlanski (2016) also measure perceptions of audit quality and find that 
jurors’ perceptions of audit quality mediate the relation between critical audit matters and auditor 
liability.   
I expect that investors will perceive more comprehensive cybersecurity risk management 
examinations to be of higher cybersecurity assurance services quality than less comprehensive 
cybersecurity assurance services and that investors’ perceptions of cybersecurity assurance 
services quality will mediate the relation between the type of cybersecurity assurance service and 
willingness to invest both in the absence and presence of a prior cybersecurity incident.  
Accordingly, I present the following mediation hypotheses: 
H3a:  Perceptions of cybersecurity assurance service quality will mediate the relation 
between the type of cybersecurity assurance service and willingness to invest in 
the absence of a cybersecurity incident. 
 
H3b:  Perceptions of cybersecurity assurance service quality will mediate the relation 
between the type of cybersecurity assurance service and willingness to invest when 
a cybersecurity incident precedes cybersecurity assurance. 
 
 
2.10 Research Method 
 
3.3.1 Participants 
Participants are 465 nonprofessional investors recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk 
platform (MTurk).  Rennekamp 2012; Koonce, Miller, and Winchel (2015); Brasel, Doxey, 
Grenier and Reffett (2016), and Farrell, Grenier, and Leiby (2017) demonstrate the 
appropriateness of using MTurk participants in accounting experiments.  I enforced strict 
qualification requirements, including a MTurk human intelligence task (HIT) approval rate 
greater than 98 percent on at least 5,000 approved HITs, no duplicate IP addresses, and 
participants located in the U.S.  To incentivize effort and attention I also implement a bonus 
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payment structure as recommended by Buchheit, Doxey, Pollard, and Stinson (2018).   
I focus on nonprofessional (i.e., retail) investors’ perceptions of cybersecurity assurance 
disclosures because the SEC is concerned about the “risks to retail investors in today’s 
marketplace” (SEC 2017b) and the grave cybersecurity threats facing the “investing public” and 
the need for more robust cybersecurity disclosures (SEC 2018a, 2).  The importance of 
nonprofessional (i.e., retail) investors’ perceptions is underscored by 44 percent of U.S. 
households (56 million households) owning mutual funds (SEC 2018d) and 52 percent of U.S. 
households owning stock (Federal Reserve 2017).  These nonprofessional investors have a 
heightened awareness of cybersecurity risks because many cybersecurity incidents involving the 
theft of sensitive customer information are highly publicized (e.g., Equifax, Target, and Yahoo).  
Nonprofessional investors also have a heightened awareness of cybersecurity risks because their 
personal information and devices are increasingly digitally connected and susceptible to 
cybersecurity threats (e.g., NCSA 2017; SEC 2017c). 
The participants are on average 37.5 years old with 15.9 years of work experience and 
56.4 percent are male.17  On average, the participants have taken 2.0 accounting and finance 
courses and have purchased or sold individual stocks or mutual funds 17.3 times.  Thus, the 
participants are an appropriate proxy for nonprofessional investors.  Further, 91.2 (97.8) percent 
of participants report having have made in-store (online) department store purchases in the last 
three months and 33.1 percent of participants report having been a victim of identity theft or 
credit card fraud.  On average, participants spent 6.34 minutes completing the experiment 
corresponding to a compensation of $9.26 per hour.  In support of random assignment of 
participants to experimental conditions, multiple comparisons with Tukey HSD do not indicate 
                                                 
17 Institutional Review Board approval was obtained prior to recruiting participants and collecting data. 
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any significant between-group differences in terms of investment experience, accounting and 
finance courses, work experience, age, gender, time spent on the task, identity theft or credit card 
fraud, in-store purchases, and online purchases.18   
 
3.3.2 Experimental Task and Design 
The experiment employs a 2 x 2 between-participant design and manipulates type of 
cybersecurity assurance service as a more comprehensive cybersecurity risk management 
examination or a less comprehensive vulnerability and penetration test and cybersecurity 
incident as no incident or incident precedes assurance.  The experiment is administered online 
through Qualtrics software.  In step one, participants are informed of recent cybersecurity 
guidance from U.S. regulators including the SEC’s (2018a) guidance for public company 
cybersecurity disclosures and the new National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 
Cybersecurity Framework developed under U.S. Executive Order 13636 and formalized by the 
U.S. Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2014 (NIST 2018).  I provide this regulatory 
information to participants because although it is in the process of being widely publicized to 
nonprofessional investors in the popular press (e.g., Javers 2018; McKenna 2018; Pisani 2018; 
Schroeder and Finkle 2018; Shumsky 2018; Skroupa 2018; Stone 2018; Woods 2018) it is 
relatively new at the time of conducting the experiment. 
Participants are then provided background information about a fictitious company, Cost 
Saver.  The background information includes financial performance ratios and statistics for the 
company as well as corresponding industry averages.  Participants are also provided information 
                                                 
18 Given that I did not detect significant between-group differences, the results reported are based on analyses 
without control variables. The results are qualitatively similar when the control variables are included in the models. 
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about the company’s e-commerce strategy.  Comprehension check questions are used to assess 
whether participants attend to and understand the background information.   
In step two of the experiment, participants are presented with management disclosures 
that describe the nature and timing of a cybersecurity incident and that Cost Saver obtained a 
cybersecurity assurance service from an independent third party.  Participants are randomly 
presented one of the four experimental conditions: (1) more comprehensive cybersecurity risk 
management examination and no cybersecurity incident, (2) less comprehensive vulnerability 
and penetration test and no cybersecurity incident (3) more comprehensive cybersecurity risk 
management examination and cybersecurity incident precedes assurance, and (4) less 
comprehensive vulnerability and penetration test and cybersecurity incident precedes assurance.   
Participants in the cybersecurity incident precedes assurance conditions are presented a 
management disclosure explaining that management has detected a cybersecurity incident 
compromising sensitive customer data and has obtained cybersecurity assurance services in 
response to the cybersecurity incident.  Participants in the no cybersecurity incident conditions 
are not informed of a cybersecurity incident.  
Participants in the more comprehensive conditions are provided a management disclosure 
explaining that management has engaged one of the world’s leading audit, tax, and advisory 
professional services firms to conduct a cybersecurity risk management program examination.  
The description of the high assurance service is adapted from an illustrative cybersecurity risk 
management examination report provided by the AICPA (AICPA 2017b).  Comprehensive 
cybersecurity risk management examinations include all components of a cybersecurity risk 
management program such as the nature of business operations and information at risk, 
cybersecurity risk management program objectives, risk assessments, governance structure, 
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communications, monitoring, and control processes (AICPA 2017b).  Alternatively, participants 
in the less comprehensive vulnerability and penetration test conditions are provided a 
management disclosure explaining that management engaged one of the world’s leading audit, 
tax, and advisory professional services firms to conduct an automated vulnerability and 
penetration test.  Less comprehensive vulnerability and penetration tests include only one control 
within a cybersecurity risk management program (AICPA 2017b).  Although vulnerability and 
penetration tests are offered by many alternative providers (Kuranda 2017), the description of the 
less comprehensive cybersecurity assurance service is adapted from a cybersecurity risk service 
currently offered by one of the big four audit, tax, and advisory professional services firms (e.g., 
Deloitte 2018b).  The adaptation of the service used in the experiment focuses on aspects of the 
service that reflect a less comprehensive assurance service.  In addition, examples of recent 
cybersecurity disclosures made by a leading provider of credit services in the U.S. (Equifax 
2017) and a leading provider of health benefits in the U.S. (Anthem 2015) also contribute to the 
wording of the cybersecurity disclosures used in the experiment.   
Participants are then asked to provide their willingness to invest.  Next, participants 
provide their perceptions of cybersecurity assurance services quality and perceptions of 
management credibility.  Finally, participants answer manipulation check and demographic 
questions.  
 
3.3.3 Dependent Variable 
Willingness to Invest.  Drawing on prior research (e.g., Elliott, Rennekamp, and White 
2015; Tang and Venkataraman 2018), I measure investors’ willingness to invest based on the 
average of investment attractiveness and investment likelihood.  To measure investment 
attractiveness, I ask participants how attractive an investment in Cost Saver is on a 7-point Likert 
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scale anchored on 1 (very unattractive) and 7 (very attractive).  To measure investment 
likelihood, participants are asked to assume that they are given $10,000 to invest in the 
department store retail industry and to indicate the likelihood that they will invest in Cost Saver 
relative to its peers in the department store retail industry on a 7-point Likert scale anchored on 1 
(more likely to invest in peers) and 7 (more likely to invest in Cost Saver). 
 
3.3.4 Other Measured Variables 
Perceptions of Cybersecurity Assurance Services Quality.  As noted by the SEC, 
“Cybersecurity efforts must include, in addition to assessment, prevention and mitigation, 
resilience and recovery” (SEC 2017d, 1).  SEC Chairman Clayton further states “we also must 
recognize…that there will be intrusions, and that a key component of cyber risk management is 
resilience and recovery” (SEC 2017a, 1).  Given the importance of both prevention and recovery 
in cybersecurity risk management, I measure investors’ perceptions of cybersecurity assurance 
services quality by asking participants to rate the quality of the cybersecurity assurance service 
(cybersecurity risk management examination or vulnerability and penetration test) in assessing 
Cost Saver's ability to (a) prevent future cybersecurity incidents and (b) recover from future 
cybersecurity incidents that are not prevented.  I measure responses on 7-point Likert scales 
anchored on 1 (very low quality) and 7 (very high quality).  I combine the two measures for 
hypothesis testing and examine the individual measures in additional analyses.  
Perceptions of Management Credibility.  Mercer’s (2004) disclosure credibility 
framework suggests that investors’ perceptions of management credibility, external assurance, 
and contextual factors together effect investors’ valuation judgments.  Although I do not 
manipulate management credibility directly in this study, it is possible that management’s choice 
to acquire a more comprehensive external assurance service will influence investors’ perceptions 
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of management credibility (Pflugrath et al. 2011), consistent with source credibility theory 
(Birnbaum and Stegner 1979) and the importance of the credibility of a message’s source.  That 
is, management’s choice to acquire a more comprehensive cybersecurity assurance service may 
signal to investors that management is confident in the organization’s cybersecurity risk 
management program and that management believes that cybersecurity risk management is 
important to the overall business strategy thereby increasing investors’ perceptions of 
management credibility.  If this signal indeed leads to higher perceptions of management 
credibility, higher perceptions of management credibility will impact investors’ valuation 
judgments (Mercer 2004).   
Given the uncertainty of how investors will interpret management’s choice to acquire a 
more comprehensive cybersecurity assurance service, I measure perceptions of management 
credibility for additional analyses.  Specifically, I measure perceptions of the competence of 
management related to actions taken to manage and reduce cybersecurity risk on a 7-point Likert 
scale, anchored on 1 (very incompetent) and 7 (very competent) and perceptions of 
trustworthiness of management related to actions taken to manage and reduce cybersecurity risk 
on a 7-point Likert scale, anchored on 1 (very untrustworthy) and 7 (very trustworthy).  
Consistent with prior research (e.g., Koonce and Lipe 2010; Rennekamp 2012), I combine these 
two measures into a single measure of perceptions of management credibility.  I then investigate 
whether perceptions of management credibility mediate the relation between perceptions of 
cybersecurity assurance services quality and willingness to invest.  
 
60 
 
2.11 Results 
 
3.4.1 Manipulation Checks 
In order to incentivize effort and attention and following the recommendation in Buchheit 
et al. (2018), participants are informed that they would be compensated for satisfactory 
participation as well as an extra bonus if they answer all comprehension and manipulation check 
questions correctly.  Out of a total of 465 complete responses, 320 participants answer both 
manipulation check questions correctly.  The results reported in the paper are based on analyses 
that include all participants, but results are qualitatively similar when participants failing one or 
more manipulation check questions are excluded from the analyses.  
 
3.4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3.1 provides descriptive statistics.  When no incident is reported, the mean (std 
dev.) willingness to invest in the more comprehensive assurance condition is 5.55 (0.91) 
compared to 5.27 (0.95) in the less comprehensive assurance condition.  These means appear to 
provide support for H1 that predicts that when no cybersecurity incident is reported, investors are 
more willing to invest in the presence of more compared to less comprehensive cybersecurity 
assurance services.  When an incident is reported, the mean (std dev.) willingness to invest in the 
more comprehensive condition is 4.57 (1.30) compared to 4.09 (1.37) in the less comprehensive 
condition.  This difference, i.e., 0.48, appears to be larger than the difference in the no incident 
condition, i.e., 0.28, which provides preliminary support for H2.  The descriptive statistics also 
indicate that perceptions of cybersecurity assurance services quality are higher in the more 
comprehensive conditions (mean=5.48 and 5.16, S.D.=0.87 and 0.89) than in the less 
comprehensive conditions (mean=4.78 and 4.46, S.D.=1.11 and 1.12).  These results provide 
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initial support for H3a and H3b, which state that the relation between the type of cybersecurity 
assurance service and willingness to invest will be mediated by perceptions of cybersecurity 
assurance services quality both in the absence and presence of a prior cybersecurity incident. 
 
3.4.3 Tests of Hypotheses 
Table 3.2 shows the results from analysis of variance (ANOVA) that is used to test H1 
and H2.  In support of H1, the planned comparison reported in Table 3.2 Panel B shows a 
significantly higher mean willingness to invest in the more comprehensive condition compared 
to the less comprehensive condition when no cybersecurity incident is reported (p=0.033).  Table 
3.2 Panel B also shows significantly higher mean willingness to invest in the more 
comprehensive condition compared to the less comprehensive condition when a cybersecurity 
incident is reported (p=0.002).  These results suggest that a more comprehensive cybersecurity 
assurance service results in a greater willingness to invest both when there is and when there is 
not a cybersecurity incident reported prior to the assurance service.   
As noted earlier and predicted in H2, the mean willingness to invest differences between 
the more and less comprehensive conditions reported in Table 3.2 Panel B appear to be higher 
when an incident is present (0.48) than when it is absent (0.28).  However, as reported in Table 
3.2 Panel A, the interaction effect is insignificant (p=0.167) and H2 is not supported.  This 
unexpected result may be due to nonprofessional investors’ already heightened awareness of 
cybersecurity risk even in the absence of a prior incident.  Highly publicized incidents such as 
Equifax, Target, and Yahoo, are increasingly prevalent (SEC 2018b).  Nonprofessional 
investors’ expectations are perhaps similar to regulators with respect to no organization “is 
immune from cyberattack” (SEC 2018b, 1) and “…there will be intrusions” (SEC 2017a, 1).  
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H3a and H3b predict that perceptions of cybersecurity assurance services quality will 
mediate the relation between the type of cybersecurity assurance service and willingness to 
invest both in the absence of a cybersecurity incident and when a cybersecurity incident precedes 
assurance.  Given the insignificant interaction effect and for ease of exposition, I exclude the 
interaction effect in the primary test of H3 mediation analyses and thereby do not test H3a and 
H3b separately.  For completeness, after reporting these results I also provide the results from an 
analysis of conditional indirect effects of type of cybersecurity assurance service on willingness 
to invest when the mediation analysis includes the interaction effect, which allows for 
independent tests of H3a and H3b.  All mediation analyses are performed using PROCESS 
(Hayes 2018). 
Figure 3.1 and Table 3.3 Panel A show mediation analysis results from a model that 
includes the two manipulated variables as independent variables, perceptions of cybersecurity 
assurance services quality as a mediating variable, and willingness to invest as the dependent 
variable.  The results in Figure 3.1 appear to support H3 overall by indicating significant and 
positive relations between the type of assurance and perceptions of cybersecurity assurance 
services quality (p<0.001) and between perceptions of cybersecurity assurance services quality 
and willingness to invest (p<0.001).  The results in Table 3.3 Panel A provide more formal 
support for H3 overall by testing the indirect effect (the mediation effect).  More specifically, 
based on a 95 percent confidence level and 5,000 bootstrap samples (used for all confidence 
intervals reported), the confidence interval for the indirect effect of the type of assurance on 
willingness to invest through perceptions of cybersecurity assurance services quality (effect 
size=0.21) is entirely above zero (0.09 to 0.34).  Thus, as predicted by H3 overall, the relation 
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between type of assurance and willingness to invest is mediated by perceptions of cybersecurity 
assurance services quality.  
An analysis of conditional indirect effects provides more specific support for both H3a 
and H3b.  The conditional indirect effects are based on a model with the type of assurance as the 
independent variable, cybersecurity incident as a moderating variable, perceptions of 
cybersecurity assurance services quality as a mediator, and willingness to invest as the dependent 
variable.  The results in Table 3.4 show significant conditional indirect effects for the type to 
quality to willingness path both when a cybersecurity incident is absent (confidence interval from 
0.06 to 0.37) and when a cybersecurity incident is present (confidence interval from 0.01 to 
0.41).  Further, as expected given the insignificant interaction effect in the ANOVA model, the 
difference between the two indirect effects is not significant (confidence interval from -0.25 to 
0.24). 
 
3.4.4 Additional Analyses 
Perceptions of Management Credibility Mediation Analysis.  To examine whether 
perceptions of management credibility mediate the relation between perceptions of cybersecurity 
assurance services quality and willingness to invest, I examine a serial mediation model with 
perceptions of cybersecurity assurance services quality and perceptions of management 
credibility as the mediators between type of assurance and willingness to invest.  Figure 3.2 
presents the results for the individual paths in this mediation model and Table 3.3 Panel B 
provides the results for the indirect effects. 
The path coefficients in Figure 3.2 are similar to those reported in Figure 3.1 except for 
the direct effect of perceptions of cybersecurity assurance services quality on willingness to 
invest, which is 0.66 (p<0.001) in Figure 3.1 and 0.18 (p=0.004) in Figure 3.2.  The apparent 
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decrease in this direct effect is due to the addition of perceptions of management credibility as a 
mediating variable between perceptions of cybersecurity assurance services quality and 
willingness to invest.  Further, the path between perceptions of cybersecurity assurance services 
quality and perceptions of management credibility is positive and significant (coef=0.87; 
p<0.001).  The subsequent path between perceptions of management credibility and willingness 
to invest is also positive and significant (coef=0.57; p<0.001).  These two positive effects 
suggest that perceptions of management credibility acts as a significant mediator between 
perceptions of cybersecurity assurance services quality and willingness to invest.  More formal 
support for this conjecture is provided by the significant results for the type to quality to 
credibility to willingness path indirect effect reported in Table 3.3 Panel B.  More specifically, 
the confidence interval for this indirect effect (effect size=0.16) is entirely above zero (0.06 to 
0.26). 
Prevention versus Recovery Mediation Analysis.  Given the importance of both 
prevention and recovery in cybersecurity risk management, I perform a mediation analyses that 
replaces the perceptions of cybersecurity assurance services quality mediating variable in Figure 
3.1 with two parallel mediators representing the two dimensions of cybersecurity assurance 
services quality (see Figure 3.3).  The two dimensions measure perceptions of the quality of the 
cybersecurity assurance service in assessing Cost Saver's ability to (a) prevent future 
cybersecurity incidents and (b) recover from future cybersecurity incidents that are not 
prevented.   
Figure 3.3 and Table 3.3 Panel C present the parallel mediation model results.  Figure 3.3 
shows that the type of assurance has a positive and significant effect on recover (coef=0.54; 
p<0.001) and an insignificant effect on prevent (coef=0.10; p=0.329).  Table 3.3 Panel C 
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showing results for the indirect effects with recover and prevent as the mediators between type 
of assurance and willingness to invest provide similar results.  The type to recover to willingness 
path indirect effect is significant (confidence interval from 0.08 to 0.25), but the type to prevent 
to willingness path indirect effect is not significant (confidence interval from -0.04 to 0.12).  
Additionally, a comparison of the two indirect effects indicates that the recover indirect effect is 
significantly more positive than the prevent indirect effect (confidence interval from 0.01 to 
0.22).  These results suggest that the more comprehensive conditions result in higher perceptions 
of cybersecurity assurance services quality primarily because of the perception that the company 
is more prepared to recover from future cybersecurity incidents that are not prevented. 
 
2.12 Conclusion 
In response to increasing cybersecurity risks, the AICPA recently released a 
cybersecurity risk management examination service designed to provide assurance about 
organizations’ cybersecurity risk management programs (AICPA 2017a).  Considering the 
voluntary and non-standardized nature of the current cybersecurity risk management assurance 
services market (AICPA 2017a; Kuranda 2017) and the limited success of a previous AICPA IT-
related voluntary assurance reporting initiative called WebTrust (Mauldin and Arunachalam 
2002; Gendron and Barrett 2004), it is important to understand how the new comprehensive 
AICPA cybersecurity service would be perceived by stakeholders.  I conduct an experiment to 
investigate how nonprofessional investors perceive and react to management disclosures related 
to alternative types of external cybersecurity assurance.  I focus specifically on nonprofessional 
investors because the SEC is concerned about the grave cybersecurity threats facing the investing 
public and the need for more robust cybersecurity disclosures (SEC 2017b, 2018a).   
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I find that investors are more willing to invest when management disclosures describe a 
more compared to less comprehensive type of cybersecurity assurance service.  This result is 
significant both in the absence of a reported cybersecurity incident and when a cybersecurity 
incident precedes cybersecurity assurance.  I also find that investors’ perceptions of 
cybersecurity assurance services quality mediate the relation between type of cybersecurity 
assurance service and willingness to invest.  Additional analyses suggest that a more 
comprehensive assurance service results in higher perceptions of cybersecurity assurance 
services quality because of the perception that the company is more prepared to recover from 
future cybersecurity incidents that are not prevented.  The results also show that management’s 
choice to acquire a more comprehensive external cybersecurity assurance service has a positive 
effect on investor perceptions of management credibility, which in turn has a positive effect on 
willingness to invest.   
This study makes three contributions to research and practice.  First, this study 
contributes to the growing literature related to cybersecurity assurance disclosures.  Using an 
experimental method, I am able to examine effects of the AICPA’s new cybersecurity risk 
management examination service in comparison to competing external assurance services and 
answer the AICPA’s call for research on how users react to cybersecurity assurance reporting 
(AAA 2017a, 2017b).  I also shed light on investors’ perceptions of vital aspects of cybersecurity 
risk management assurance in terms of an organization’s ability to not only prevent future 
cybersecurity incidents, but also to recover from future incidents that are not prevented – an 
important finding as cybersecurity incidents are inevitable and a key component of cybersecurity 
risk management is recovery (SEC 2017a, 2017d). 
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Second, I contribute to the voluntary assurance disclosure literature by examining 
investors’ reactions to managements’ disclosures of alternative types of voluntary external 
cybersecurity assurance service and show that the comprehensiveness of the voluntary assurance 
service voluntarily disclosed by management affects users’ judgments and decisions.  I also find 
that management’s choice to acquire a more comprehensive cybersecurity assurance service has 
a positive effect on investor perceptions of management credibility, which in turn has a positive 
effect on willingness to invest.  Management’s choice may signal to investors that management 
is confident in the organization’s cybersecurity risk management program and that management 
believes that cybersecurity risk management is important to the overall business strategy. 
Third, this study makes an important contribution to practice.  The new cybersecurity risk 
management examination service shares many features with the AICPA’s previous WebTrust 
service that did not fare well in the marketplace.  Yet, providing preliminary evidence that the 
AICPA’s new SOC for Cybersecurity service may garner greater market acceptability, my 
results suggest that nonprofessional investors are sensitive to the type of cybersecurity assurance 
service provided, and companies can benefit from investing in more comprehensive 
cybersecurity risk management assurance services such as the AICPA’s SOC for Cybersecurity.  
This is an important finding given that cybersecurity has become a top concern for public 
companies and their boards who are looking to CPA firms to increasingly report on cybersecurity 
program effectiveness (AICPA 2018; Deloitte 2018a; EY 2018; AAA 2019). 
These findings should be interpreted in light of certain limitations that can also provide 
future research opportunities.  First, although the new cybersecurity guidance from regulators 
(SEC 2018a; NIST 2018) is in the process of being widely publicized to nonprofessional 
investors in the popular press, it is possible that the observed results will not generalize to less 
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informed investors.  Future studies could also examine whether professional investors react 
differently than nonprofessional investors to alternative voluntary cybersecurity assurance 
service disclosures.  Second, the retail industry is held constant to control for industry effects and 
to make the setting more salient to nonprofessional investors.  However, future research could 
examine whether alternative cybersecurity assurance services affect investors’ perceptions and 
decisions differently by industry.  Third, to explore potential differences between the AICPA’s 
new cybersecurity risk management examination service and competing assurance services the 
service provider is held constant in the manipulations.  By instead holding the cybersecurity 
assurance service constant, future research could examine the effects of the service provider on 
investor perceptions and decisions.  Such research could also be designed to examine investors’ 
perceptions of CPAs’ expertise in the context of cybersecurity assurance services. 
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2.13 Tables for Essay 2 
 
Table 3.1: Essay 2 Descriptive Statistics – Mean (Standard Deviations) 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Willingness to Invest includes investment attractiveness and investment likelihood. Participants rate 
investment attractiveness and investment likelihood on a seven-point scales with endpoints “very unattractive” and 
“very attractive” and endpoints “very likely to invest in peers” and “very likely to invest in Cost Saver” respectively. 
Perceptions of Cybersecurity Assurance Services Quality includes perceptions of prevent and recover. Participants 
rate the quality of the assurance service in assessing Cost Saver's ability to (a) prevent future cybersecurity incidents 
and (b) recover from future cybersecurity incidents that are not prevented on seven-point scales with endpoints 
“very low quality” and “very high quality.” 
 
  
Type of Cybersecurity Assurance Service Cybersecurity Incident   
 No Incident 
Incident Precedes 
Assurance Row Means 
More Comprehensive     
Willingness to Invest 5.55 (0.91) 4.57 (1.30) 5.06 (1.22) 
Cybersecurity Assurance Services Quality 5.48 (0.87) 4.78 (1.11) 5.13 (1.06) 
 n = 118 n = 117 n = 235     
Less Comprehensive    
Willingness to Invest 5.27 (0.95) 4.09 (1.37) 4.69 (1.32) 
Cybersecurity Assurance Services Quality 5.16 (0.89) 4.46 (1.12) 4.82 (1.07) 
 n = 117 n = 113 n = 230     
Column Means   Grand Means 
Willingness to Invest 5.41 (0.94) 4.34 (1.36) 4.88 (1.28) 
Cybersecurity Assurance Services Quality 5.32 (0.9) 4.62 (1.13) 4.98 (1.07) 
  n = 235 n = 230 n = 465 
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Table 3.2: The Effect of Type of Cybersecurity Assurance Service and Cybersecurity 
Incident on Willingness to Invest 
 
Panel A:  Conventional ANOVA 
Source df MS F-value p-value 
     
Type of Cybersecurity Assurance Service 1 16.848 12.708 < 0.001
Cybersecurity Incident 1 135.959 102.549 < 0.001
Assurance X Incident (H2) 1 1.243 0.937 0.167
Error 461    
  
 
Panel B:  Planned Comparison 
Relation Mean Difference F-value p-value 
     
More > Less Comprehensive for No Incident (H1) 0.277 3.408 0.033 
More > Less Comprehensive for Incident  0.484 10.163 0.002 
          
 
Notes: P-values are reported one-tailed when the path coefficient is in the expected direction, otherwise two-tailed. 
Cybersecurity Incident is manipulated as no cybersecurity incident or cybersecurity incident precedes cybersecurity 
assurance. Type of Cybersecurity Assurance Service is manipulated as more or less comprehensive. Willingness to 
Invest includes investment attractiveness and investment likelihood. Participants rate investment attractiveness and 
investment likelihood on a seven-point scales with endpoints “very unattractive” and “very attractive” and endpoints 
“very likely to invest in peers” and “very likely to invest in Cost Saver” respectively.  
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Table 3.3: Indirect Effects of Type of Cybersecurity Assurance Service on Willingness to 
Invest 
 
Panel A: Cybersecurity Assurance Services Quality Mediation  
Pathsa Effect Standard Confidence Interval Limits   
Errorb Lowerb Upperb 
Type  Quality  Willingness 0.21 0.06 0.09 0.34 
 
Panel B: Perceptions of Management Credibility Mediation     
Pathsa Effect Standard Confidence Interval Limits   
Errorb Lowerb Upperb 
Total 0.21 0.07 0.06 0.35 
Type  Quality  Willingness 0.06 0.03 0.01 0.12 
Type  Credibility  Willingness -0.01 0.04 -0.08 0.07 
Type  Quality  Credibility  Willingness 0.16 0.05 0.06 0.26 
 
Panel C: Prevent versus Recover Mediation 
Pathsa Effect Standard Confidence Interval Limits   
Errorb Lowerb Upperb 
Total 0.20 0.07 0.07 0.33 
Type  Prevent  Willingness 0.04 0.04 -0.04 0.12 
Type  Recover  Willingness 0.16 0.04 0.08 0.25 
Indirect effect contrast 0.12 0.05 0.01 0.22 
a Type of Cybersecurity Assurance Service is manipulated as more or less comprehensive. Willingness to Invest 
includes investment attractiveness and investment likelihood. Participants rate investment attractiveness and 
investment likelihood on a seven-point scales with endpoints “very unattractive” and “very attractive” and 
endpoints “very likely to invest in peers” and “very likely to invest in Cost Saver” respectively. Perceptions of 
Cybersecurity Assurance Services Quality includes perceptions of prevent and recover. Participants rate the 
quality of the assurance service in assessing Cost Saver's ability to (a) prevent future cybersecurity incidents and 
(b) recover from future cybersecurity incidents that are not prevented on seven-point scales with endpoints “very 
low quality” and “very high quality.” Perceptions of Management Credibility includes perceptions of 
management competence and trustworthiness. Participants rate management competence and trustworthiness on a 
seven-point scales with endpoints “very incompetent” and “very competent” and endpoints “very untrustworthy” 
and “very trustworthy” respectively.   
b All mediation analyses are performed using PROCESS (Hayes 2018) with 5,000 bootstrap samples and 95% 
level of confidence.  
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Table 3.4: Conditional Indirect Effects of Type of Assurance on Willingness to Invest 
 
Conditiona Pathsb Effect Standard Confidence Interval Limits 
 
  
Errorc Lowerc Upperc 
Incident = 0 Type  Quality  Willingness 0.21 0.08 0.06 0.37 
Incident = 1 Type  Quality  Willingness 0.21 0.10 0.01 0.41 
 Indirect effect contrast 0.00 0.12 -0.25 0.24 
a Cybersecurity Incident is manipulated as no cybersecurity incident or cybersecurity incident precedes 
cybersecurity assurance. Type of Cybersecurity Assurance Service is manipulated as more or less comprehensive. 
Willingness to Invest includes investment attractiveness and investment likelihood. Participants rate investment 
attractiveness and investment likelihood on a seven-point scales with endpoints “very unattractive” and “very 
attractive” and endpoints “very likely to invest in peers” and “very likely to invest in Cost Saver” respectively. 
Perceptions of Cybersecurity Assurance Services Quality includes perceptions of prevent and recover. 
Participants rate the quality of the assurance service in assessing Cost Saver's ability to (a) prevent future 
cybersecurity incidents and (b) recover from future cybersecurity incidents that are not prevented on seven-point 
scales with endpoints “very low quality” and “very high quality.”  
b All mediation analyses are performed using PROCESS (Hayes 2018) with 5,000 bootstrap samples and 95% 
level of confidence.  
c Indirect effects are tested when a cybersecurity incident is absent (Incident = 0) and when a cybersecurity 
incident precedes cybersecurity assurance (Incident = 1). 
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2.14 Figures for Essay 2 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Perceptions of Cybersecurity Assurance Services Quality Mediation Analysis  
Notes: Path coefficients and p-values are obtained using PROCESS (Hayes 2018) with 5,000 bootstrap samples and 
95% level of confidence. 
Cybersecurity Incident is manipulated as no cybersecurity incident or cybersecurity incident precedes cybersecurity 
assurance. Type of cybersecurity assurance service is manipulated as more or less comprehensive. Willingness to 
Invest includes investment attractiveness and investment likelihood. Participants rate investment attractiveness and 
investment likelihood on a seven-point scales with endpoints “very unattractive” and “very attractive” and endpoints 
“very likely to invest in peers” and “very likely to invest in Cost Saver” respectively. Perceptions of Cybersecurity 
Assurance Services Quality includes perceptions of prevent and recover. Participants rate the quality of the 
assurance service in assessing Cost Saver's ability to (a) prevent future cybersecurity incidents and (b) recover from 
future cybersecurity incidents that are not prevented on seven-point scales with endpoints “very low quality” and 
“very high quality.”  
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Figure 3.2: Perceptions of Management Credibility Mediation Analysis 
Notes: Path coefficients and p-values are obtained using PROCESS (Hayes 2018) with 5,000 bootstrap samples and 
95% level of confidence. 
Cybersecurity Incident is manipulated as no cybersecurity incident or cybersecurity incident precedes cybersecurity 
assurance. Type of cybersecurity assurance service is manipulated as more or less comprehensive. Willingness to 
Invest includes investment attractiveness and investment likelihood. Participants rate investment attractiveness and 
investment likelihood on a seven-point scales with endpoints “very unattractive” and “very attractive” and endpoints 
“very likely to invest in peers” and “very likely to invest in Cost Saver” respectively. Perceptions of Cybersecurity 
Assurance Services Quality includes perceptions of prevent and recover. Participants rate the quality of the 
assurance service in assessing Cost Saver's ability to (a) prevent future cybersecurity incidents and (b) recover from 
future cybersecurity incidents that are not prevented on seven-point scales with endpoints “very low quality” and 
“very high quality.” Perceptions of Management Credibility includes perceptions of management competence and 
trustworthiness. Participants rate management competence and trustworthiness on a seven-point scales with 
endpoints “very incompetent” and “very competent” and endpoints “very untrustworthy” and “very trustworthy” 
respectively.  
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Figure 3.3: Perceptions of Cybersecurity Assurance Services Quality: Prevent versus 
Recover Mediation Analysis 
Notes: Path coefficients and p-values are obtained using PROCESS (Hayes 2018) with 5,000 bootstrap samples and 
95% level of confidence. 
Cybersecurity Incident is manipulated as no cybersecurity incident or cybersecurity incident precedes cybersecurity 
assurance. Type of cybersecurity assurance service is manipulated as more or less comprehensive. Willingness to 
Invest includes investment attractiveness and investment likelihood. Participants rate investment attractiveness and 
investment likelihood on a seven-point scales with endpoints “very unattractive” and “very attractive” and endpoints 
“very likely to invest in peers” and “very likely to invest in Cost Saver” respectively. Perceptions of Cybersecurity 
Assurance Services Quality includes perceptions of prevent and recover. Participants rate the quality of the 
assurance service in assessing Cost Saver's ability to (a) prevent future cybersecurity incidents and (b) recover from 
future cybersecurity incidents that are not prevented on seven-point scales with endpoints “very low quality” and 
“very high quality.” 
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Chapter 4. Dissertation Conclusion 
The first essay, The Impact of Cybersecurity Risk Management Examinations and 
Cybersecurity Incidents on Investor Perceptions and Decisions, examines the effect of voluntary 
disclosures of joint or separate provisioning of cybersecurity risk management examinations on 
investor perceptions and decisions, and whether these effects differ when a subsequent 
cybersecurity incident occurs.  Interestingly, I find that the negative signal of a subsequent 
cybersecurity incident reverses investors’ positive perceptions of auditor competence and 
increases investors’ sensitivity to potential independence impairments when the cybersecurity 
risk management examination is jointly provisioned, leading to lower perceptions of audit 
quality.  I also find that investors are less willing to invest when the cybersecurity risk 
management examination is jointly compared to separately provisioned.  My results provide 
important insights to regulators and standard setters who have raised concerns regarding the 
importance of addressing cybersecurity risk in the integrated internal control over financial 
reporting and financial statements audits and the potential for independence impairments from 
increased auditor performed non-audit services such as the cybersecurity examination service.  
My study also contributes to the non-audit services literature not only by examining a unique and 
emerging non-audit service not previously examined, but also by showing that non-audit services 
are perceived differently depending on whether a negative signal of non-audit service quality is 
present. 
Essay 2, The Impact of the Type of Cybersecurity Assurance Service and Cybersecurity 
Incidents on Investor Perceptions and Decisions examines the effect of the type of cybersecurity 
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assurance service on investor perceptions and decisions and whether these effects differ when a 
prior cybersecurity incident is reported.  I find that investors are more willing to invest and have 
higher perceptions of management credibility when voluntary disclosures include a cybersecurity 
risk management examination compared to a less comprehensive cybersecurity assurance 
service.  These findings are important because public company boards are increasingly looking 
to audit firms to provide cybersecurity assurance services.  I also find that investors perceive 
cybersecurity risk management examinations to provide higher assurance quality regarding an 
organization’s ability not only to prevent future cybersecurity incidents, but also to recover from 
those that are not prevented - a key risk management issue raised by regulators.  My study also 
contributes to the voluntary assurance disclosure literature by examining investor reactions to 
management disclosures of alternative types of voluntary external cybersecurity assurance 
service, beyond a comparison of the absence or presence of external assurance reports provided 
by CPAs previously examined in other non-financial voluntary assurance settings.  I also find 
that management’s choice to acquire a more comprehensive cybersecurity assurance service has 
a positive effect on investors’ perceptions of management credibility, which in turn has a 
positive effect on investors’ willingness to invest.   
Both essays contribute to the growing literature related to cybersecurity risks.  Most of 
this work has been archival in nature and as such, has not been able to examine the effects of the 
AICPA’s recently adopted cybersecurity risk management examination reporting.  Using an 
experimental method, I am able to examine important implications of voluntary cybersecurity 
risk management examination reporting and present several opportunities for future research.  
First, future research could examine whether professional investors react differently than 
nonprofessional investors to cybersecurity risk management examination and cybersecurity 
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incident disclosures.  Second, I hold the retail industry constant in both essays to control for 
industry effects and make the setting more salient to the participants.  Future research could 
examine whether cybersecurity risk management examination and cybersecurity incident 
disclosures impact investors’ perceptions and decisions differently by industry.  Third, the 
cybersecurity assurance service providers examined in both essays are the large audit firms.  
Future research could examine investor perceptions of CPAs’ expertise in the context of 
cybersecurity risk management examinations.  Fourth, future research could examine variables in 
addition to perceptions of competence, independence, and audit quality that provide additional 
insights into investors’ judgment and decision making in the context of joint provisioning of 
cybersecurity non-audit services.  Fifth, although archival data on the level of fees associated 
with cybersecurity risk management examination non-audit services are not yet available, the 
experimental method could be used in future research to examine the impact of the level of 
cybersecurity examination fees on investor perceptions and decisions.  Finally, future research 
could examine the impact of alternative cybersecurity incidents, i.e., type of incident, type of 
information or other asset compromised, length, timing, and severity of the security event, etc., 
on investor perceptions and decisions in the context of voluntary cybersecurity risk management 
examination disclosures. 
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Appendix A: Experimental Instrument for Essay 1 
Instructions:  Please assume the role of a potential investor and carefully consider all the information in the following case before 
answering the questions that follow.  
 
  
Background and Initial Valuation 
Background   
Cost Saver Corporation operates a national chain of discount department stores.  Cost Saver has over 11,800 stores nationwide 
and grew rapidly in the late 1990s and early 2000s by adding additional stores.  Similar to many other retailers, Cost Saver is making 
significant investments in ecommerce and in 2017 online sales accounted for 16.4% of total sales.  To drive a greater proportion of 
their sales through their ecommerce website, Cost Saver provides promotions and makes it easy for in-store customers to create 
online user profiles by automatically (after consent from the customer) storing their personal and payment information.   
    
Cost Saver Stock Information   
Cost Saver released its 2017 fiscal year financial statements on February 15, 2018.  Cost Saver’s 2017 sales increased by 6.5 
percent compared to analyst expectations of 6.1 percent and earnings increased by 8.1 percent compared to analyst expectations of 
6.3 percent.  Analysts increased the stock price target from $56 the day before the results were released to $70 the day after the 
results were released.  Cost Saver’s stock closing price was $50 the day before the financial statement were released.     
    
Audit Engagement   
Big 4 Firm A has been Cost Saver’s auditor for the past six years.  Big 4 Firm A is one of the four largest global accounting firms 
offering audit, assurance, consulting, and tax services.  The local office that performs the Cost Saver audit has extensive experience 
auditing companies in the retail industry, but Cost Saver is one of the local office’s largest and most complex clients, especially in 
terms of internal controls.  Cost Saver’s move towards increasing reliance on ecommerce has further increased the importance and 
complexity of the internal controls over financial reporting evaluation on the Cost Saver audit.  The audit of Cost Saver has, however, 
been fairly eventless and Cost Saver received a clean financial statement audit opinion and clean internal controls over financial 
reporting opinion just as it has in each of the past six years. 
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Were Cost Saver’s earnings better or worse than analyst expectations?   
o Better  (1)  
o Worse  (2)  
 
 
 
Has Cost Saver’s move towards increasing reliance on ecommerce further increased the importance and complexity of the internal 
controls evaluation on the Cost Saver audit?  
o Yes  (1)  
o No  (2)  
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Very 
Unattractive 
(1) 
Unattractive 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Unattractive 
(3) 
Neither 
Attractive 
nor 
Unattractive 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Attractive 
(5) 
Attractive 
(6) 
Very 
Attractive 
(7) 
In your 
opinion, 
how 
attractive 
of an 
investment 
is Cost 
Saver? (1)  
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
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Very 
Unlikely 
(1) 
Unlikely 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Unlikely 
(3) 
Neither 
Likely nor 
Unlikely 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Likely (5) Likely (6) 
Very 
Likely (7) 
Assuming 
you were 
given 
$10,000 to 
invest in 
the 
department 
store retail 
industry, 
how likely 
are you to 
invest a 
portion of 
this 
amount in 
the stock 
of Cost 
Saver? (1)  
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
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Condition 1 - Joint and No Incident 
 
Cybersecurity Examination   
Cost Saver makes significant investments in cybersecurity to support its strategy to grow online sales.  In response to increasing 
public concern about cybersecurity threats, especially in the wake of highly publicized attacks at Target and Yahoo, Cost Saver 
decided to make a voluntary disclosure about these investments and its cybersecurity risk management program.  In the disclosure, 
Cost Saver’s management asserted that Cost Saver maintained effective controls over cybersecurity risk management as described 
by the criteria established by the AICPA.        
 
Further, Cost Saver decided to hire an independent third party to perform an annual examination of the effectiveness of the controls 
within the cybersecurity risk management program.  Cost Saver decided to hire Big 4 Firm A, the same firm that currently performs 
the audit of financial statements and related internal controls, to conduct the cybersecurity examination.      
 
Big 4 Firm A performed the cybersecurity examination during the same time period that the financial statement and related internal 
controls audit work was performed.  The cybersecurity assessment resulted in a clean opinion.  That is, Big 4 Firm A concluded that 
management's assertion that the company maintained, in all material respects, effective internal controls over cybersecurity risk 
management as of December 31, 2017, based on criteria established by the AICPA was fairly stated.  The report was issued on 
February 15, 2018, the same day that the financial statements were released.      
 
As of March 8, 2018, three weeks after Cost Saver released its financial statements and cybersecurity examination disclosure and 
related clean audit opinions, Cost Saver has not detected any cybersecurity incidents (breaches). 
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Condition 2 - Separate and No Incident 
 
Cybersecurity Examination   
Cost Saver makes significant investments in cybersecurity to support its strategy to grow online sales.  In response to increasing 
public concern about cybersecurity threats, especially in the wake of highly publicized attacks at Target and Yahoo, Cost Saver 
decided to make a voluntary disclosure about these investments and its cybersecurity risk management program.  In the disclosure, 
Cost Saver’s management asserted that Cost Saver maintained effective controls over cybersecurity risk management as described 
by the criteria established by the AICPA.        
 
Further, Cost Saver decided to hire an independent third party to perform an annual examination of the effectiveness of the controls 
within the cybersecurity risk management program.  Cost Saver decided to hire Big 4 Firm B, a different firm than the current 
financial statement and related internal controls auditors, to conduct the cybersecurity examination.      
 
Big 4 Firm B performed the cybersecurity examination during the same time period that the financial statement and related internal 
controls audit work was performed.  The cybersecurity assessment resulted in a clean opinion.  That is, Big 4 Firm B concluded that 
management's assertion that the company maintained, in all material respects, effective internal controls over cybersecurity risk 
management as of December 31, 2017, based on criteria established by the AICPA was fairly stated.  The report was issued on 
February 15, 2018, the same day that the financial statements were released.    
 
As of March 8, 2018, three weeks after Cost Saver released its financial statements and cybersecurity examination disclosure and 
related clean audit opinions, Cost Saver has not detected any cybersecurity incidents (breaches). 
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Condition 3 - Joint and Subsequent Cybersecurity Incident 
 
Cybersecurity Examination   
Cost Saver makes significant investments in cybersecurity to support its strategy to grow online sales.  In response to increasing 
public concern about cybersecurity threats, especially in the wake of highly publicized attacks at Target and Yahoo, Cost Saver 
decided to make a voluntary disclosure about these investments and its cybersecurity risk management program.  In the disclosure, 
Cost Saver’s management asserted that Cost Saver maintained effective controls over cybersecurity risk management as described 
by the criteria established by the AICPA.        
 
Further, Cost Saver decided to hire an independent third party to perform an annual examination of the effectiveness of the controls 
within the cybersecurity risk management program.  Cost Saver decided to hire Big 4 Firm A, the same firm that currently performs 
the audit of financial statements and related internal controls, to conduct the cybersecurity examination.      
 
Big 4 Firm A performed the cybersecurity examination during the same time period that the financial statement and related internal 
controls audit work was performed.  The cybersecurity assessment resulted in a clean opinion.  That is, Big 4 Firm A concluded that 
management's assertion that the company maintained, in all material respects, effective internal controls over cybersecurity risk 
management as of December 31, 2017, based on criteria established by the AICPA was fairly stated.  The report was issued on 
February 15, 2018, the same day that the financial statements were released.      
 
On March 8, 2018, three weeks after Cost Saver released its financial statements and cybersecurity examination disclosure and 
related clean audit opinions, Cost Saver issued the following statement publicly: “We have detected a cybersecurity incident that 
occurred in the first week of March 2018.  The breach allowed criminals to gain access to sensitive customer data, including name, 
birth dates, home addresses, and credit card numbers, expiration dates and security codes.  We believe that up to 20 million 
customer accounts were impacted.” 
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Condition 4 - Separate and Subsequent Cybersecurity Incident 
 
Cybersecurity Examination   
Cost Saver makes significant investments in cybersecurity to support its strategy to grow online sales.  In response to increasing 
public concern about cybersecurity threats, especially in the wake of highly publicized attacks at Target and Yahoo, Cost Saver 
decided to make a voluntary disclosure about these investments and its cybersecurity risk management program.  In the disclosure, 
Cost Saver’s management asserted that Cost Saver maintained effective controls over cybersecurity risk management as described 
by the criteria established by the AICPA.        
 
Further, Cost Saver decided to hire an independent third party to perform an annual examination of the effectiveness of the controls 
within the cybersecurity risk management program.  Cost Saver decided to hire Big 4 Firm B, a different firm than the current 
financial statement and related internal controls auditors, to conduct the cybersecurity examination.      
 
Big 4 Firm B performed the cybersecurity examination during the same time period that the financial statement and related internal 
controls audit work was performed.  The cybersecurity assessment resulted in a clean opinion.  That is, Big 4 Firm B concluded that 
management's assertion that the company maintained, in all material respects, effective internal controls over cybersecurity risk 
management as of December 31, 2017, based on criteria established by the AICPA was fairly stated.  The report was issued on 
February 15, 2018, the same day that the financial statements were released.      
 
On March 8, 2018, three weeks after Cost Saver released its financial statements and cybersecurity examination disclosure and 
related clean audit opinions, Cost Saver issued the following statement publicly: “We have detected a cybersecurity incident that 
occurred in the first week of March 2018.  The breach allowed criminals to gain access to sensitive customer data, including name, 
birth dates, home addresses, and credit card numbers, expiration dates and security codes.  We believe that up to 20 million 
customer accounts were impacted.” 
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Post Manipulations Measures 
  
 
 
Very 
Unattractiv
e (1) 
Unattractiv
e (2) 
Somewhat 
Unattractiv
e (3) 
Neither 
Attractive 
nor 
Unattractiv
e (4) 
Somewh
at 
Attractive 
(5) 
Attractiv
e (6) 
Very 
Attractiv
e (7) 
You previously indicated that the 
attractiveness of an investment in Cost 
Saver was 
${PreAttract/ChoiceGroup/SelectedAnsw
ers}. Based on the additional 
cybersecurity information you have 
received since then, in your opinion, how 
attractive of an investment is Cost Saver? 
(1)  
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
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Very 
Unlikely 
(1) 
Unlikely 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Unlikely 
(3) 
Neither 
Likely 
nor 
Unlikely 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Likely (5) 
Likely 
(6) 
Very 
Likely 
(7) 
You previously indicated that the likelihood 
that you would invest in Cost Saver was 
${PreInvest/ChoiceGroup/SelectedAnswers}. 
Based on the additional cybersecurity 
information you have received since then, 
assuming you again were given $10,000 to 
invest in the department store retail industry, 
how likely are you to invest a portion of this 
amount in the stock of Cost Saver? (1)  
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
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Other Measured Variables 
 
Competence:  Auditors are competent when they have relevant knowledge and the ability to use this knowledge in a specific 
auditing context.   
 
Very 
Unconfident 
(1) 
Unconfident 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Unconfident 
(3) 
Neither 
Confident 
nor 
Unconfident 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Confident 
(5) 
Confident 
(6) 
Very 
Confident 
(7) 
How confident are you 
in Big 4 
Firm ${e://Field/Firm}'s 
competence in Cost 
Saver's 
cybersecurity 
examination?  (1)  
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
How confident are you 
in Big 4 Firm 
A's competence in 
Cost Saver's financial 
statement and related 
internal controls 
audit?  (2)  
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
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Independence:  Auditors are independent when they act with integrity and objectivity, and without biases, and when they do not give 
in to pressure from management.  
 
Very 
Unconfident 
(1) 
Unconfident 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Unconfident 
(3) 
Neither 
Confident 
nor 
Unconfident 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Confident 
(5) 
Confident 
(6) 
Very 
Confident 
(7) 
How confident 
are you that Big 
4 Firm 
${e://Field/Firm} 
acted 
independently 
when 
performing 
Cost Saver’s 
cybersecurity 
examination? 
(1)  
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
How confident 
are you that Big 
4 Firm A acted 
independently 
when 
performing 
Cost Saver's 
financial 
statement and 
related internal 
controls audit? 
(2)  
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
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Quality:  How confident are you that sufficient evidence was obtained and used to support: 
 
Very 
Unconfident 
(1) 
Unconfident 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Unconfident 
(3) 
Neither 
Confident 
nor 
Unconfident 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Confident 
(5) 
Confident 
(6) 
Very 
Confident 
(7) 
Big 4 
Firm ${e://Field/Firm}’s clean 
opinion that the 
cybersecurity controls are 
effective and designed as 
described by Cost 
Saver?  (1)  
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Big 4 Firm A’s clean opinion 
that Cost Saver maintained 
effective internal controls 
over financial reporting? (2)  
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Big 4 Firm A’s clean opinion 
that the financial 
statements faithfully 
represent Cost Saver’s 
underlying economics? (3)  
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
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Manipulation Checks 
 
 
 
Was the audit firm providing the cybersecurity examination the same audit firm providing the financial statement audit and related 
internal controls audit?   
o Yes  (1)  
o No  (2)  
 
 
 
 
Did Cost Saver report a cybersecurity incident (breach)?   
o Yes  (1)  
o No  (2)  
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PEQ 
 
 
 
How many times have you purchased or sold individual stock or mutual funds? 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
How many accounting or finance courses have you taken?   
________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
How many years of work experience do you have?  
________________________________________________________________ 
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How many times have you made online purchases in the last 3 months? 
o Never  (1)  
o 1-3 times  (2)  
o 4-6 times  (3)  
o More than 6 times  (4)  
 
 
 
 
How many times have you made in-store purchases at a department store in the last 3 months? 
o Never  (1)  
o 1-3 times  (2)  
o 4-6 times  (3)  
o More than 6 times  (4)  
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Have you ever been a victim of identity theft or credit card fraud?  
o Yes  (1)  
o No  (2)  
 
 
 
 
What is your age? 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
What is your gender? 
o Female  (1)  
o Male  (2)  
o Prefer not to answer  (3)  
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Appendix B: Experimental Instrument for Essay 2 
 
Instructions:  Please assume the role of a potential investor and carefully consider all the information in the following case before 
answering the questions that follow.  
 
 
Regulatory Background 
 
This section provides you with background information on cybersecurity to inform you of recent guidance from U.S. regulators. 
   
On February 21, 2018, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued new guidance for public company cybersecurity 
disclosures to include descriptions of cybersecurity incidents and actions taken to manage and reduce cybersecurity risk. 
   
One of the leading frameworks for helping organizations manage and reduce cybersecurity risk is the NIST Cybersecurity 
Framework.  The framework includes the following five essential functions:  
     Identify:        Understanding of the business, risk assessment, and governance.   
Protect:        Processes, controls, and technology to protect information.   
Detect:         Vulnerability scans and continuous monitoring to detect security events.   
Respond:     Response planning, analysis, and mitigation.   
Recover:      Recovery planning, communications, and improvements.     
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Comprehension Questions 
 
Which of the following functions is not included in the NIST Cybersecurity Framework?   
o Protect 
o Respond  
o Recover  
o Eliminate  
 
 
Vulnerability scans is an example of which NIST Cybersecurity Framework function? 
o Detect  
o Recover  
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Cost Saver Background 
This section provides background information, including the most recent fiscal year-end financial information and e-commerce 
strategy, about a company that you are considering investing in. 
   
Cost Saver Inc.  
(NYSE MKT: CSVR) 
   
Profile Description: 
Cost Saver Corporation operates a national chain of discount department stores.  The company is listed on NYSE and is included in 
the S&P 500.  Cost Saver has over 11,800 stores nationwide and is headquartered in Denver, Colorado.  The company grew rapidly 
in the late 1990s and early 2000s by adding additional stores.  More recently, Cost Saver has been able to continue growing by 
increasing online sales.  Cost Saver’s e-commerce strategy is to both provide low cost and rapid delivery options to customer homes 
as well as leverage its physical footprint and have customers place orders online and then pick up their purchases at a local Cost 
Saver store.  To drive a greater proportion of its sales through its website, Cost Saver makes it easy for in-store customers to create 
online user profiles by automatically storing personal and payment information after consent from the customer.  
   
In response to increasing public concern about cybersecurity risk and to support its e-commerce strategy, Cost Saver made the 
following disclosure: “We have made significant investments in cybersecurity to support our e-commerce growth strategy.” 
   
 Key Statistics and Ratios: 
                 Cost Saver    Industry Average     
     Earnings Per Share (EPS)    $5.33    $4.31        
    Price to Earnings (P/E)    13.42    16.58        
    Return on Equity (ROE)    25.8%    19.4%        
    Sales Growth %     3.0%    2.3%        
    Analysts’ Earnings Surprise %   13.1%    4.2%         
 
 Source: Yahoo Finance 
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Comprehension Questions 
 
Were Cost Saver’s earnings better or worse than analyst expectations?   
o Better 
o Worse 
 
 
Has Cost Saver made investments in cybersecurity to support its e-commerce growth strategy? 
o Yes 
o No 
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Condition 1 – More Comprehensive Cybersecurity Examination and No Incident 
Subsequent to the most recent fiscal year-end financial information, Cost Saver’s management issued the following statement 
publicly: 
   
“We engaged one of the world’s leading audit, tax, and advisory professional services firms to conduct a 
comprehensive cybersecurity risk management program examination including collecting and evaluating evidence regarding controls 
designed to perform the following five functions:    
 protect information and systems from security events, and to   
 detect,  
 respond to,  
 mitigate, and   
 recover from security events that are not prevented.    
  
We received a clean attestation opinion supporting:    
 our description of our cybersecurity program including business operations and information at risk, cybersecurity objectives, 
risk assessment, governance structure, communications, monitoring, and control processes, and   
 the effectiveness of the controls within our cybersecurity program based on the Trust Services Criteria for Security, 
Availability, Processing Integrity, Confidentiality, and Privacy consistent with the attestation standards established by the 
AICPA.”  
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Condition 2 – Less Comprehensive Vulnerability and Penetration Test and No Incident 
Subsequent to the most recent fiscal year-end financial information, Cost Saver’s management issued the following statement 
publicly: 
   
“We engaged one of the world’s leading audit, tax, and advisory professional services firms to conduct an automated vulnerability 
and penetration test and to recommend solutions.  The automated vulnerability and penetration test is designed to identify and 
evaluate gaps in our information technology applications, hardware configurations, and operating systems that are designed to 
perform the following two functions:    
 prevent and   
 detect vulnerabilities.    
  
We received a report detailing the results of the automated vulnerability and penetration test including:    
 gaps in our information technology applications, hardware configurations, and operating systems, and   
 recommended solutions for closing the gaps in our information technology applications, hardware configurations, and 
operating systems based on our evolving cybersecurity landscape.”  
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Condition 3 – More Comprehensive Cybersecurity Examination and Incident Precedes Assurance 
Subsequent to the most recent fiscal year-end financial information, Cost Saver’s management issued the following statement 
publicly: 
   
“We have detected a cybersecurity incident.  The incident allowed criminals to gain access to sensitive customer data, including 
name, birth dates, home addresses, and credit card numbers, expiration dates and security codes.  We believe that up to 20 million 
customer accounts were impacted.  In response, and to position Cost Saver for the future: 
 
We engaged one of the world’s leading audit, tax, and advisory professional services firms to conduct a comprehensive cybersecurity 
risk management program examination including collecting and evaluating evidence regarding controls designed to perform the 
following five functions:    
 protect information and systems from security events, and to   
 detect,  
 respond to,  
 mitigate, and   
 recover from security events that are not prevented.    
  
We received a clean attestation opinion supporting:    
 our description of our cybersecurity program including business operations and information at risk, cybersecurity objectives, 
risk assessment, governance structure, communications, monitoring, and control processes, and   
 the effectiveness of the controls within our cybersecurity program based on the Trust Services Criteria for Security, 
Availability, Processing Integrity, Confidentiality, and Privacy consistent with the attestation standards established by the 
AICPA.”  
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Condition 4 - Less Comprehensive Vulnerability and Penetration Test and Incident Precedes Assurance 
Subsequent to the most recent fiscal year-end financial information, Cost Saver’s management issued the following statement 
publicly: 
   
“We have detected a cybersecurity incident.  The incident allowed criminals to gain access to sensitive customer data, including 
names, birth dates, home addresses, and credit card numbers, expiration dates and security codes.  We believe that up to 20 million 
customer accounts were impacted.  In response, and to position Cost Saver for the future: 
   
We engaged one of the world’s leading audit, tax, and advisory professional services firms to conduct an automated vulnerability and 
penetration test and to recommend solutions.  The automated vulnerability and penetration test is designed to identify and evaluate 
gaps in our information technology applications, hardware configurations, and operating systems that are designed to perform the 
following two functions:    
 prevent and   
 detect vulnerabilities.    
  
We received a report detailing the results of the automated vulnerability and penetration test including:    
 gaps in our information technology applications, hardware configurations, and operating systems, and   
 recommended solutions for closing the gaps in our information technology applications, hardware configurations, and 
operating systems based on our evolving cybersecurity landscape.”  
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Dependent Variable 
 
 
 
Very 
Unattractive 
(1) 
Unattractive 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Unattractive 
(3) 
Neither 
Attractive 
nor 
Unattractive 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Attractive 
(5) 
Attractive 
(6) 
Very 
Attractive 
(7) 
In your 
opinion, 
how 
attractive 
of an 
investment 
is Cost 
Saver?  
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
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Very 
likely to 
invest in 
Peers (1) 
Likely to 
invest in 
Peers (2) 
Somewhat 
likely to 
invest in 
Peers (3) 
Indifferent 
between 
investing 
in Peers 
or Cost 
Saver (4) 
Somewhat 
likely to 
invest in 
Cost 
Saver (5) 
Likely to 
invest in 
Cost 
Saver (6) 
Very 
likely to 
invest in 
Cost 
Saver (7) 
Assuming 
you were 
given 
$10,000 to 
invest in 
the 
department 
store retail 
industry, 
what is the 
likelihood 
that you 
will invest 
in Cost 
Saver 
relative to 
its peers in 
the 
department 
store retail 
industry?  
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
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Measured Variables 
 
How would you rate the quality of the ${e://Field/Assurance} in assessing Cost Saver's ability to: 
 
Very Low 
Quality 
(1) 
Low 
Quality 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Low 
Quality (3) 
Neither 
High nor 
Low 
Quality 
(4) 
Somewhat 
High 
Quality (5) 
High 
Quality 
(6) 
Very 
High 
Quality 
(7) 
a. prevent 
future 
cybersecurity 
incidents? 
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
b. recover 
from future 
cybersecurity 
incidents 
that are not 
prevented? 
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
 
 
 
 
122 
 
 
 
Very 
Incompetent 
(1) 
Incompetent 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Incompetent 
(3) 
Neither 
Competent 
nor 
Incompetent 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Competent 
(5) 
Competent 
(6) 
Very 
Competent 
(7) 
How would 
you rate the 
competence 
of Cost 
Saver’s 
management 
related to 
actions taken 
to manage 
and reduce 
cybersecurity 
risk? 
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
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Very 
Untrustworthy 
(1) 
Untrustworthy 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Untrustworthy 
(3) 
Neither 
Trustworthy 
nor 
Untrustworthy 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Trustworthy 
(5) 
Trustworthy 
(6) 
Very 
Trustworthy 
(7) 
How would you rate 
the trustworthiness 
of Cost Saver’s 
management related 
to actions taken to 
manage and reduce 
cybersecurity risk?  
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
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Manipulation Checks 
Which cybersecurity service did Cost Saver’s management engage the professional services firm to conduct?  
o A vulnerability and penetration test 
o A cybersecurity risk management program examination 
 
 
Did Cost Saver's management report a cybersecurity incident?   
o No.  Cost Saver's management did not report a cybersecurity incident.  
o Yes.  The cybersecurity incident impacted over 20 million customer accounts. 
 
  
125 
 
 
Post Experiment Questions 
How many times have you purchased or sold individual stocks or mutual funds? 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
How many accounting or finance courses have you taken?  
________________________________________________________________ 
 
How many years of work experience do you have? 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
How many times have you made online purchases in the last 3 months?  
o Never 
o 1-3 times 
o 4-6 times 
o More than 6 times 
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How many times have you made in-store purchases at a department store in the last 3 months? 
o Never 
o 1-3 times 
o 4-6 times  
o More than 6 times 
 
Have you ever been a victim of identity theft or credit card fraud?  
o Yes 
o No  
 
What is your age? 
________________________________________________________________ 
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Gender What is your gender? 
o Female 
o Male  
o Prefer not to answer 
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